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Making America Great Again  
versus Made in China 
The US Geo-Economic Rivalry with China
Stormy-Annika Mildner und Claudia Schmucker
The trade conflict between the United States and China is a severe threat to the 
world economy. While the debate over the effectiveness of tariffs is at a steady 
boil in the United States, the EU is opposed to tariffs as a means for dealing with 
China. Although serious issues with China must be addressed – such as dumping 
and subsidization – tariffs will make the United States neither more competitive nor 
secure. Instead of forging a go-it-alone approach, there is a lot the United States 
and the EU could do together.
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2 
The United States and China are engaged in a trade con-
flict, which verges on the edge of a full-fledged trade war. 
In 2018, the administration of US President Donald Trump 
levied additional tariffs on imports from China with a 
value of 250 billion US dollars: 25 percent on imports 
worth 50 billion dollars; 10 percent on 200 billion. In May 
2019, Trump further increased the tariffs from 10 precent 
to 25 percent and threatened to also subject the remain-
ing imports of Chinese goods to additional tariffs. The 
reason was an alleged erosion of commitments by China.
The United States has had a large deficit in merchan-
dise trade with China for many years – the deficit in 
trade in goods is higher than that with any other coun-
try in absolute numbers.1 Trump believes that China’s 
unfair trade practices are responsible for the persistent 
deficit: subsidization of domestic companies, overcapaci-
ties, forced technology transfer, and theft of intellectual 
property rights. However, the trade conflict is about much 
more than the US trade deficit; it is about a competition 
between economic and political systems, and it is very 
much about economic dominance and political power. US 
President Donald Trump sees China as a major economic 
adversary. Although the United States and China are ne-
gotiating a bilateral trade deal, it is thus unlikely that the 
conflict will be put to rest for good.
The trade conflict has already taken its toll. The Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) emphasized in its world 
economic outlook from April 2019 that the risks for the 
global economy have increased. The World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) has downgraded its outlook for trade 
growth for 2018 to 3.9 percent (September 2018; down 
from an original estimate of 4.4 percent in April); growth 
is expected to further decrease to 3.7 percent in 2019.2 
Particularly, “activity softened amid an increase in trade 
tensions and tariff hikes between the United States and 
China, a decline in business confidence, a tightening of 
financial conditions, and higher policy uncertainty across 
many economies,” according to the IMF.3 In addition, in 
2018, China’s economic growth dropped to the lowest rate 
since 1990, caused by, among others, lower consumer 
spending and investment due to the trade conflict with 
the United States.4 This is also affecting European – and, 
in particular German – businesses, which are heavily 
invested in both the United States and China. European 
companies producing in the United States and exporting 
to China (and vice versa) are facing higher costs due to 
the additional tariffs. Exports from China, which face 
greater hurdles entering the United States, are partly 
diverted to Europe, putting pressure on domestic produc-
ers. The depressed growth outlook in China also dampens 
demand for European goods and services. In addition, the 
US-China trade conflict has massively increased uncer-
tainties in the global economy, which is bad for business 
everywhere. Last but not least, the frustration of the 
United States with China has spilled over into the WTO, 
threatening the organization that for decades has ensured 
rules-based and open trade. 
In part, Trump is right: China has become a heavy-
weight in the world economy but has yet to assume 
responsibility for the world economic order. This view is 
also shared by European countries; the EU is currently de-
vising a new China strategy – a first paper was presented 
in March 2019. The EU is also becoming much tougher on 
China. 
However, Trump’s goals are fundamentally flawed. 
The president seems to want to decouple the United 
States from China – in other words, to massively reduce 
the economic interdependence of the two superpowers. 
Not only will this strategy not work, the policies of the 
president are simply dangerous and could easily backfire 
politically and economically. Rather, the United States 
should consider the following five-point strategy in order 
to advance its own competitiveness and to ensure multi-
lateral, open, and rules-based trade. 
 . Devise a domestic reform agenda for competitiveness: 
The United States is rightly concerned about fair com-
petition with China. However, the country would be 
well-advised to focus more on its own strengths – and 
weaknesses. The United States needs to invest more 
in its ailing infrastructure and in education to address 
the skills gap. More research and development and a 
greater focus on sciences are needed.
 . Work together with allies: The United States should use 
the combined economic and political strength of its 
partners – such as Germany and the EU – to get mean-
ingful and binding reforms in China. To reestablish lost 
trust in the transatlantic relationship, the United States 
should phase out all tariffs implemented in the name of 
national security and abstain from further tariffs, such 
as those threatened on cars and car parts. Further, the 
United States should enhance the scope and focus of the 
Trilateral Initiative with the EU and Japan. The com-
bined weight of the three partners makes it much more 
likely that China will make meaningful concessions 
than unilateral threats. The Trilateral Initiative could 
also deal with 5G security and tech regulation.
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 . Reform international organizations: The United States 
was the main driver in establishing liberal international 
organizations like the WTO after World War II, benefit-
ting from the multilateral trading system for decades. 
Today, the Trump administration has blatantly put 
the WTO dispute settlement system in danger, thus 
undermining the effectiveness of the organization. The 
United States is right in pointing out the deficiencies of 
the system, but the means for how to achieve reforms 
are wrong. Decision-making in the WTO is based on 
consensus. The United States should therefore engage 
in the reform debates in a more constructive way, table 
its own reform proposals (including those on dispute 
settlement), and form alliances with like-minded coun-
tries. The proposal introduced by the United States that 
aims to improve compliance with transparency obliga-
tions is one example.
 . Pursue meaningful bilateral trade deals: In addition, 
bilateral and regional trade agreements are a great 
opportunity to create strong economic partnerships 
and ambitious trade rules for new issues. The Transpa-
cific Partnership, now called the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Transpacific Partnership 
(CPTPP), is a case in point. Modern trade agreements 
include investment liberalization, transparent rules 
on services, strong intellectual property rights protec-
tion, open digital trade, and rules on fair competition 
(which relates to subsidies and state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs)). Such agreements set standards worldwide and 
are another way to incentivize structural reforms in 
China.
 . Work with China on a meaningful trade and investment 
deal: For years, the United States and China had negoti-
ated an investment treaty, covering both the protection 
of investment as well as market access issues. This 
agreement would have been binding under internation-
al law. President Trump put these negotiations on ice. 
Instead, the United States and China are currently ne-
gotiating a bilateral trade deal, which is more transac-
tional than binding in nature. The United States needs 
to be careful that the deal does not backfire by hurting 
the global trading order. 
Germany and the rest of Europe have a strong interest 
in a de-escalation of the US-China trade conflict, both 
politically as well as economically. The United States and 
China are both attractive markets – choosing between 
them is not a viable option for European business. Euro-
pean companies depend on open and rules-based global 
trade and, therefore, a functioning multilateral trading 
order. Last but not least, a bilateral US-China trade deal, 
which would grant preferential treatment to US busi-
nesses in China, risks distorting trade and investment, as 
well as hurting global value chains. 
The EU also has some homework to do, however. Fore-
most, it needs to work on a coherent and unified China 
policy. The strategic outlook presented in March 2019 was 
a first step in the right direction, but much more needs to 
be done. At the EU-China summit on April 9, 2019 both 
sides agreed to reform the WTO rules for subsidies, to 
base their economic relationship on openness, non-dis-
crimination and fair competition, and to fight protection-
ism. However, there are no concrete steps and deadlines 
in the declaration. The EU therefore needs to make sure 
that China also implements the promised reforms. In ad-
dition, the EU should try to channel shared US grievances 
with Chinese trade policies toward multilateral solutions 
whenever possible. This means working on new WTO 
rules on subsidies and state-owned-enterprises as well 
as dealing with steel overcapacities in the context of the 
Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity. Last but not least, 
the EU needs to do its share in revitalizing the transatlan-
tic relationship. In mid-April 2019 the EU finally agreed to 
two negotiation mandates for trade talks with the United 
States. The transatlantic partners met in Washington 
D.C. in early May 2019 to commence talks on the mutual 
recognition of conformity assessment. Now, they should 
also kick-start the negotiations on industrial tariffs.
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1. Introduction
In February 2019, the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) published its annual report on 
China and the compatibility of the country’s trade policy 
with the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
According to the report, China presented a unique and 
serious challenge for members of the WTO. Forced 
technology transfer, market access restrictions, export 
and import substitution subsidies, and export barriers are 
just a few of the practices that the report criticizes.5 The 
report came at the same time as the United States and 
China are engaged in negotiations on a bilateral trade 
deal to address many of the aforementioned issues. 
US President Donald Trump sees China as a major 
economic adversary – and he has done so for quite a long 
time. In an interview in 2015, he stated, “Because it’s an 
economic enemy, because they have taken advantage 
of us like nobody in history. They have; it’s the greatest 
theft in the history of the world what they’ve done to 
the United States. They’ve taken our jobs.”6 In a similar 
tone, Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy criticizes 
that China challenged American power, influence, and 
interests, attempting to erode American security and 
prosperity: “They [China and Russia] are determined 
to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their 
militaries, and to control information and data to repress 
their societies and expand their influence.”7 
Many in the United States share Trump’s perception 
of this threat. According to a report of the Pew Research 
Center polling institute, 47 percent of Americans view 
China unfavorably (38 percent positive). The top issues 
Americans are concerned about include the large US debt 
held by China, cyberattacks from China, the country’s im-
pact on the global economy, the loss of US jobs to China, 
and the US trade deficit with China.8
The United States has had a large deficit in merchan-
dise trade with China for many years. Amounting to 378.7 
billion US dollars in 2018, the deficit in trade in goods is 
higher than that with any other country in absolute num-
bers.9 However, the trade war is about much more than 
the US trade deficit. It is very much about a competition 
between economic and political systems. And it is about 
power and economic dominance. The United States is 
deeply worried about China’s industrial policy – a hybrid 
mix of state planning and interventionism, as well as mar-
ket reforms. This was reinforced by the “Made in China 
2025” strategy, which aims to make the country a “manu-
facturing superpower.” In addition, the One Belt and One 
Road Initiative (OBOR) – China’s gigantic infrastructure 
project to build and expand trade and infrastructure net-
works between China and over 70 other African, Asian, 
and European countries – severely bothers the United 
States. 
China has become a heavyweight in the world econ-
omy (see Figure 1) but has yet to assume responsibility 
for the world economic order. For instance, it not only is 
much less open economically than advanced countries, it 
has also been hindering a reform of the WTO by blocking 
talks about state-owned enterprises and state subsidies, 
as well as special and differential treatment for develop-
ing countries. Moreover, the country frequently fails to 
adhere to the rules of the WTO and its own Accession 
Protocol to the organization. 
President Trump is therefore right in his criticism. But 
the goal of the president to decouple the United States 
from China is fundamentally flawed, and his policies are 
quite dangerous. First, his strategy will not work, because 
the two economies are too deeply integrated through 
trade and investment. Second, the tit-for-tat tariff escala-
tion is likely to backfire on the US and global economy. 
The loss of a major export markets and the rising costs for 
intermediary goods – coupled with increased uncertainty 
in the global economy – have already taken their toll 
on the US economy. Third, while China has made some 
concessions – for example, regarding forced technology 
transfer – none of these are legally binding and enforce-
able in a reliable way. It is unlikely that a US-China deal 
will address the underlying problems, rooted in China’s 
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economic model. What’s more, it will not end the compe-
tition between the two superpowers for dominance in the 
international system.
Additional tariffs will make the United States neither 
more competitive nor secure. The Chinese market is criti-
cal to the global competitiveness of US companies, and 
US consumers benefit greatly from imports of lower-cost 
goods from China. Rather, the United States needs to 
invest more in infrastructure and seriously address the 
skills gap. Instead of engaging in threat scenarios and 
tit-for-tat protectionist spirals, the right way ahead would 
be solving these issues within the WTO. At the same time, 
the EU and the United States should work more closely 
together on advancing national policy instruments, such 
as competition law, to address unfair trade policies.
The following study analyzes the geo-economic rivalry 
between the United States and China, pointing the flash-
light on the United States and trade, in particular. It will 
start by giving an overview of economic interdependen-
cies between China and the Unites States, before cover-
ing in depth the current trade conflict. Last but not least, 
recommendations are given for how the United States 
and the EU could better handle the competition with the 
rising superpower of China. 
2. Economic Interdependence
US-China economic ties have expanded substantially 
since the two countries began to normalize their relation-
ship in the late 1970s. Since China’s accession to the WTO, 
the economic interdependence between the two super-
powers has increased once more.
With an export value of 188 billion US 
dollars, China was the third most impor-
tant market for US goods and services 
after Canada and Mexico (8 percent 
of total) in 2017. Regarding imports of 
goods and services, China ranked first 
(523.7 billion US dollars), which made 
the country the most important overall 
trading partner for the United States (in 
this case, EU countries are considered in-
dividually; if the EU is taken as a whole, 
the EU is the most important trading 
partner of the United States).10 
As Figure 2 shows, the United States 
runs a significant trade deficit with 
China. US imports from China expanded 
rapidly in the first years of this millen-
nium. Import growth met a first dent in 
Figure 1: The Ascent of China within the World  
Economy, 1990-2017  
Share of World GDP, based on Purchasing Power Parity (in Percent)
United States 
(in %)
European Union 
(28) (in %)
China (in %)
1990 21.8 27.4 4.1
2001 20.2 23.5 7.8
2017 15.3 16.5 18.2
Share of World Trade in Goods and Services (in percent) (Including 
Intra-EU trade)
United States 
(in %)
European Union 
(28) (in %)
China (in %)
1999    Exports
Imports
13
17
42
42
3
3
2005    Exports
Imports
10
15
40
40
6
6
2017     Exports
Imports
10
13
36
34
11
10
Share of World FDI Stocks (in Percent)
United States 
(in%)
European Union 
28 (in%)
China (in%)
1990 Inward 25 40 1
Outward 32 43 0
2001 Inward 34 32 3
Outward 32 42 0
2017 Inward 25 29 5
Outward 25 34 5
Sources: IMF (2018), <https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/
PPPSH@WEO/WEOWORLD/EU/CHN/USAl> (accessed Janu-
ary 15, 2019). WTO (2018), <http://stat.wto.org/StatisticalProgram/
WSDBViewData.aspx?Language=E (accessed January 15, 2019). 
UNCTAD (2018), <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/temp/us_fdiflowss-
tock_70356058382115.xls> (accessed January 15, 2019).
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Figure 2: Trade in Goods and Services, United States-China
1999-2017, in Billions of US Dollars
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the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2009; a second dent 
occurred in 2016. Nonetheless, as Figure 3 shows, imports 
of goods from China to the United States reached a new 
record high of 506 billion US dollars (2.6 percent of GDP) 
in 2017. The bilateral deficit in trade in goods amounted 
to 376 billion US dollars, or 1.9 percent of GDP. In contrast, 
the United States consistently runs a surplus in trade in 
services with China as Figure 4 shows. The surplus has 
been growing significantly since 2008, amounting to 40 
billion US dollars in 2017 alone.11 The positive contribu-
tion of trade in services is often overlooked, not least by 
President Trump.
In 2017, the United States primarily exported civilian 
aircraft and parts (13 percent of the total), soybeans (9 
percent), and passenger cars (8 percent) to China, as 
Figure 5 illustrates. While throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, the United States mostly imported 
low-value, labor-intensive products from 
China, technologically advanced prod-
ucts make up an increasing portion of US 
imports, which can be seen in Figure 6. 
The main import goods are cell phones 
and other household goods (14 percent), 
computers (9 percent), and equipment 
for telecommunications (7 percent). It is 
mainly in the trade of these goods that 
the United States has a large deficit, as 
can be seen in Annex A1. In contrast, the 
United States realizes a surplus with Chi-
na in the trade of large civilian aircraft 
and soybeans, as Annex A2 illustrates.
The deficit with China has many 
causes, such as the role of the US dol-
lar as a dominant global reserve and 
transaction currency, the size of the US 
market and attractiveness for foreign 
capital, US consumer spending and 
saving behavior, and macroeconomic 
policies, to name a few. In addition, the 
sharp increase in US imports from China 
can be explained by the movement in 
production facilities from other (primar-
ily Asian) countries to China.12 Further-
more, it has a lot to do with China’s place 
in global value chains. According to an 
OECD/WTO study, 32.2 percent of the 
overall value of China’s gross exports 
(40.2 percent for China’s total manufac-
tured exports) was comprised of foreign 
imports in 2011 (the latest available data 
of value added trade).13 Furthermore, US companies local-
ize in China to better serve the local and Asian markets. 
Trade statistics and balances do not reflect this fact.14
The widening bilateral trade deficit can also be attrib-
uted to strong economic growth, high employment rates, 
and stable domestic demand in the United States. At the 
same time, there was a considerable decline in US exports 
to China in certain products starting in July and August 
2018, subsequent to the implementation of retaliatory 
tariffs – which is documented in Figure A3. While exports 
in machinery and equipment grew strongly in March 
2018, with a year-on-year growth of 38.5 percent (from 3.9 
billion US dollars to 5.4 billion US dollars), exports con-
siderably decreased in a year-on-year comparison from 
July onwards (July 2018: 4.7 billion US dollars; July 2017: 
5.0 billion US dollars). In August 2018, bilateral trade in 
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Figure 3: Trade in Goods, United States-China
1999 - 2017, Billions of US Dollars
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machinery and equipment stood at 4.6 billion US dollars 
– considerably lower than in August 2017, with 5.4 billion 
US dollars. The effect of Chinese retaliatory tariffs on 
fuel products was also clearly felt, as exports decreased 
by 81 percent from July to August 2018. Export numbers 
of crude materials (except fuel) seem to fluctuate, but 
have generally tended to be declining since July 2018, 
when China implemented retaliatory measures.
The monthly statistics about trade in agricultural 
products, which are shown in Annex A3, reveal that US 
agricultural exports to China have become volatile. Au-
gust and September 2018 (directly after China imposed 
retaliatory tariffs) have seen the lowest export levels in 
22 months. In September 2018, US agricultural exports to 
China were 91 percent lower than in September 2017.
Financial interdependence is also increasing, although 
China still does not rank among the top five destinations 
or sources of foreign direct investment (FDI) for the 
United States, neither in stocks nor in flows. 15 In 2017, 
China ranked 14th regarding US FDI stocks abroad and 
10th concerning outward flows (see Figures 7 and 8). In 
the same year, China placed 14th regarding FDI stocks in 
the United States. As FDI flows from China to the United 
States were negative in 2017, the country placed only 
134th.
As can be seen in Figure 9, FDI flows between the 
United States and China (in both directions) stood at 
43.4 billion US dollars in 2017. While this was the second 
highest year to date, it marks a 28 percent drop from 
the 60 billion US dollar total in 2016. This decline was 
due to a change in Chinese policy, narrowing controls 
on outbound investment, as well as heightened invest-
ment screening undertaken by the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States. The latter specifically 
affected Chinese investment in high-tech sectors. Al-
though Chinese FDI flows to the United States overtook 
US-to-China in 2015, US FDI stocks in China have been 
historically and consistently higher, at 216.7 billion US 
dollars from 2000 to 2017, compared to 139.8 billion US 
dollars (China-to-US) within the same time period (see 
Figure 10).
Regarding industry concentration, in 2017, Chinese 
investment was strongest in American real estate and 
hospitality – although this sector showed a notable 
decline in investment from 2016 to 2017 – as well as 
transport and infrastructure, which noted an increase in 
investment in the same period. Additionally, Chinese in-
vestment was over 1 billion US dollars each (2017) in ICT 
and health and pharmaceuticals – which stayed stable 
from the previous year – as well as financial and business 
services. 
For China, FDI sourced from the United States ranked 
in 6th place. The Chinese statistics, however, are sig-
nificantly skewed, as the biggest investor is identified 
as Hong Kong, with a share of 75.5 percent of all FDI in-
flows.16 American investment in China was highest in ICT 
by far, but was also strong in entertainment, media and 
education, automotive and transportation equipment, 
agriculture and food, and real estate and hospitality.
In December 2018, China held 1.124 trillion US dollars 
in US Treasury securities (17.9 percent of securities is-
sued). The share of foreign holders of US securities can 
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Source: US Census Bureau, <ttps://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statis-
tics/product/enduse/exports/c5700.html> (accessed January 8, 2019).
Figure 5: US Exports to China  by Product Type
2017, in Percent of the Total
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Figure 6: US Imports from China by Product Type 
2017, in Percent of the Total
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be seen in Figure 11 (October 2018). The high percentage 
of US debt ownership by China highlights once again the 
mutual dependency of the two economies. For example, a 
rapid Chinese sell-off of Treasury securities would harm 
both parties, as the interest on Treasury securities would 
rise while their price would go down, thereby decreasing 
their value.
The strong economic interdependence in all fields – 
trade in goods and services, FDI, and finance – shows that 
the United States and China are mutually dependent on 
each other. Any strategy that tries to decouple the two 
economies is thus bound to fail. In other words, decou-
pling is only possible at huge economic and financial costs 
for both sides, with strong repercussions on the global 
economy. 
3. Tit-for-Tat: The Trade Conflict between the 
United States and China
3.1 Trump’s Trade Policy: Going after Unfair Trade 
President Trump’s trade policy, laid out in his Trade Policy 
Agenda of both 2018 and 2019, is much more aggres-
sive than those of his predecessors: trade policy should 
focus more on the national interests of the United States 
and, hence, be coordinated with the country’s National 
Security Strategy. The National Security Strategy of 2017 
likewise criticizes the weakening of the US economy due 
to unfair trade practices, stating, “We will insist upon fair 
and reciprocal economic relationships to address trade 
imbalances.”17  
President Trump repeatedly stated that he is not in-
terested in concluding such trade agreements that in his 
view only make competitors stronger. Rather, he intends 
to negotiate better deals to promote US jobs and prosper-
ity. “Rebuilding economic strength at home and preserv-
ing a fair and reciprocal international economic system 
will enhance our security and advance prosperity and 
peace in the world,” the Security Strategy underlines.18 
This is why Trump pulled the United States out of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership a few days after taking office. 
Further toward the top of the agenda stood the trade 
accord between the United States, Mexico, and Canada 
(NAFTA, which is known as the United States-Mexico-
Canada Agreement – USMCA – in its newly renegotiated 
form), and the free trade agreement with South Korea 
(KORUS). 
The Trump administration is also no longer willing to 
tolerate so-called unfair trade practices and is prioritiz-
ing the rigorous application of national trade laws. One 
such law is the Trade Act of 1974. Under Section 301 of 
that law, the president can take retaliatory measures, 
including imposing tariffs and quotas, if a country denies 
the United States its rights under a free trade agreement 
Figure 7: Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 
2017, Top Ten Countries
Stocks Billion 
US 
Dollars
Percent-
age of 
Total FDI 
in US
Flows Billion 
US 
Dollars
Percent-
age of 
Total FDI 
in US
United 
Kingdom
540.9 13.4%  Canada 71.9 25.9%
Japan 469 11.7%  Japan 43.9 15.8%
Canada 453.1 11.3% United 
Kingdom
43.7 15.8%
Luxem-
bourg
410.7 10.2% Switzer-
land
21.1 7.6%
Nether-
lands
367.1 9.1% France 20.8 7.5%
Germany 310.2 7.7% Nether-
lands
17.8 6.4%
Switzerland 309.4 7.7% Ireland 17.3 6.2%
France 275.5 6.8% Germany 11.9 4.3%
Ireland 147.8 3.7% Korea 10.4 3.7%
Belgium 103.5 2.6% Belgium 6.0 2.2%
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, < https://www.bea.gov/interna-
tional/di1usdbal> (accessed January 15, 2019).
Figure 8: US Foreign Direct Investment Abroad,  
2017, Top Ten Countries
Stocks Billion 
US 
Dollars
Percent-
age of 
Total 
US FDI 
abroad
Flows Billion 
US 
Dollars
Percent-
age of 
Total 
US FDI 
abroad
Nether-
lands
936.7 15.6% Ireland 44.7 14.9%
United 
Kingdom
747.6 12.4% Nether-
lands
34.5 11.5%
Luxem-
bourg
676.4 11.2% Luxem-
bourg
33.4 11.1%
Ireland 446.4 7.4% Bermuda 30 10.0%
Canada 391.2 6.5% Switzer-
land
30 10.0%
Bermuda 346.8 5.8% UK 
Islands, 
Caribbean
25.7 8.6%
UK 
Islands,  
Caribbean
331.4 5.5% United 
Kingdom
23.1 7.7%
Singapore 274.3 4.6% Canada 18.6 6.2%
Switzer-
land
245 4.2% Singapore 17.2 5.7%
Australia 168.9 2.8% China 9.9 3.3%
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, <https://www.bea.gov/international/
di1usdbal> (accessed January 17, 2019).
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or takes measures that are unjustified, unreasonable, or 
discriminatory. The Trade Policy Agenda also refers to 
the investigations into steel and aluminum imports under 
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 regarding 
their national security implications.
The Trump administration is also highly critical of the 
WTO. The USTR highlighted in the 2019 Trade Agenda 
that the organization has not always worked as expected. 
Among other things, the agenda criticizes the dispute 
settlement system for overstepping its mandate and inter-
vening in areas for which the WTO members themselves 
are responsible. As a response, the Trump administration 
is threatening the functioning of the entire organization 
by blocking the appointment of members to the Appellate 
Body and by refusing to engage in serious reform discus-
sions.
Trump’s trade policy is a considerable 
break from the liberal-institutional poli-
cies of his predecessors, not just regard-
ing content but also in style. Trump’s 
approach is very much transactional. 
The president sees himself as a deal-
maker. He sees little value in multilater-
al institutions and binding commitments 
under international law. His approach 
is bilateral, quid-pro-quo, and based on 
narrow cost-benefit analyses. He calls 
for reciprocity – product by product, 
sector by sector, and country by country. 
President Trump proudly calls himself 
the Tariff President. And he believes that 
tariffs are a good way to pursue Ameri-
can interests in trade negotiations. In his 
State of the Union Address, he said, “If 
another country places an unfair tariff 
on an American product, we can charge 
them the exact same tariff on the same 
product that they sell to us.”19 Trump 
and his team are fixated on trade bal-
ances. These are used as a measure of 
whether or not a country trades fairly. 
China stands at the center of Trump’s 
trade policy.20 
3.2 Market Access: An Unlevel Play-
ing Field
In summer 2018, the Office of Trade and 
Manufacturing Policy published a report 
outlining how China’s policies threaten 
the economic and national security of the United States. 
The report identifies five ways that China tries to aggres-
sively acquire US technology and intellectual property: 
physical and cyber theft, forced technology transfers, 
evading United States export controls, export restraints 
on raw materials, and investments in high-tech assets in 
the United States. The report also criticizes high tariffs, 
non-tariff barriers, and other regulatory hurdles.21
China’s market is much less open than that of the 
United States. In terms of the simple average Most-Fa-
vored Nation (MFN) applied tariff rates, China’s rates are 
approximately three times those of the United States for 
total trade (9.8 percent vs. 3.4 percent) and both agricul-
tural (15.6 percent vs. 5.3 percent) and non-agricultural 
trade (8.8 percent vs. 3.1 percent) (see Figure 12).
Out of 22 product groups, US tariffs are only higher 
than China’s in one sector: dairy products. As can be seen 
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Figure 10: FDI Stocks in all Industries between the United States and China
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in Figure 13, differences are starkest in seven categories 
(in which China’s tariff rates are 10 or more percentage 
points higher than the United States): cereal and prepara-
tions, cotton, sugars and confectionary, animal products, 
coffee and tea, other agricultural products, and fish and 
fish products. However, compared with other emerging 
market economies (Figure 14), China’s openness does not 
differ much from the average.
China’s market is also significantly more protected 
by non-tariff barriers than the US market, which can be 
seen in Figure 15. Out of seven categories of non-tariff 
measures imposed on all UNCTAD members, the United 
States has imposed measures for only one category more 
frequently than China (sanitary and phytosanitary mea-
sures). As the graph shows, China has imposed 571 more 
export-related measures and 1624 more technical barriers 
to trade than the United States. 
In its 2018 Foreign Trade Barriers Report, the USTR 
identified several areas of concern regarding China. 
Pointing at “Made in China 2025” – a long-term strategy 
targeting ten strategic industries – the USTR criticizes 
that domestic companies – especially state-owned en-
terprises (SOEs) – are protected and promoted by a wide 
range of industrial policies. The report criticizes, among 
others, the numerous restrictions on the level and types 
of FDI allowed in China, the joint venture obligations, 
and forced technology transfer. Another area of concern 
is the relatively ineffective enforcement of intellectual 
property rights.22 
The US government also criticizes China’s mixed 
implementation record of WTO obligations and commit-
ments undertaken in its Accession Protocol. For example, 
it still employs export barriers and has yet to join the 
Agreement on Government Procurement.23 This find-
ing is reiterated by the annual USTR report on China’s 
compliance with the rules of the WTO. In early 2019, the 
USTR concluded that “China’s market-distorting policies 
and practices harm and disadvantage its fellow WTO 
members, even as China reaps enormous benefits from its 
WTO membership.”24
3.3 Competition between the Systems
However, the problem is not only that China is not play-
ing by the rules. A report by the US Senate Committee 
on Small Business and Entrepreneurship25 summarized 
that “The ‘Made in China 2025’ industrial plan demon-
strates that the Chinese government is doing more than 
merely ‘breaking the rules,’ it is seeking to set new terms 
for international economic competition.” The United 
States is deeply worried about China’s industrial policy 
– a hybrid mix of state planning and interventionism, as 
well as market reforms. The report finds that China has 
rapidly advanced technologies in information technology, 
shipping, and energy and power generation, while invest-
ing in large-scale projects in aerospace, vehicles, and 
robotics. In a foreword, the Republican Chairman Marco 
Rubio, states, “The ‘Made in China 2025’ industrial plan 
announced in 2015 by the Chinese government makes 
their goal clear. China aims to become the global leader 
in innovation and manufacturing. This would be an unac-
ceptable outcome for American workers.”
Hong Kong
Cayman Islands
SwitzerlandLuxembourg
United Kingdom
Ireland
Brazil
China 
Belgium
Rest of the World
17.9%
4.8%
4.5%
4.4%
3.8%3.7%
3.4%
3.1%
3.0%
34.9%
Japan16.6%
Source: Department of the Treasury/Federal Reserve Board, <http://tic-
data.treasury.gov/Publish/mfh.txt> (accessed January 8, 2019).
Figure 11: Foreign Holders of US Securities
December 2018, by Percentage
Figure 12: Degree of Trade Openness: United States and China
Simple Average 
Final Bound Tariff 
Rate: 
Total Trade
Simple Average 
Final Bound Tariff 
Rate: 
Agricultural Trade
Simple Average 
Final Bound Tariff 
Rate: 
Non-Agricultural 
Trade
Simple Average 
MFN Applied Tar-
iff Rate (2017):
Total Trade
Simple Average 
MFN Applied Tar-
iff Rate (2017):
Agricultural Trade
Simple Average 
MFN Applied Tar-
iff Rate (2017):
Non-Agricultural 
Trade
United States 3.4 4.9 3.2 3.4 5.3 3.1
China 10 15.7 9.1 9.8 15.6 8.8
Source: WTO Tariff Profile, <http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfile/WSDBTariffPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=CN,US> (accessed January 9, 2019).
Making America Great Again versus Made in China: The US Geo-Economic Rivalry with China  11
DGAPanalyse  / Nr. 2 /  June 2019
One of these sectors is the telecommunication sector, 
which has received considerable attention within the 
Made in China 2025 strategy. China has made massive 
technological advances. The Chinese company Huawei, 
for example, is one of the top electronics makers in the 
word. China’s forthcoming satellite-navigation system 
will compete with America’s GPS, undermining Wash-
ington’s geopolitical dominance in this area. The United 
States government has thus banned Huawei from its 
plan to build new 5G technologies, the Next Generation 
Mobile Network, a technology necessary for advancing 
the Internet of Things and Industry 4.0. Trump issued an 
executive order in mid-May, 2019. Declaring a national 
emergency, the President prohibited the purchase or use 
of any communications technology produced by entities 
controlled by “a foreign adversary” and likely to create an 
“undue risk of sabotage” of US communications systems or 
“catastrophic effects” to US infrastructure.
Subsequently, the Department of Commerce added 
Huawei to its so called “entity list”, which makes it neces-
sary for US companies to receive licenses in order to do 
business with Huawei. It is expected that the DOC is un-
likely to grant such licences which would mean a de facto 
ban of transactions with Huawei.26
Another sector of great concern is biotechnology. The 
United States-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission – a congressional commission of the United 
States government, responsible for monitoring and 
investigating national security and trade issues between 
the United States and China – released a report on China’s 
biotechnology development mid-February 2019. The 
report states that even though today the United States is 
the leading biotechnology nation in the world, China is 
quickly catching up due to its large population and its ef-
forts to advance in this field. The report warns that China 
is also becoming more and more important in the field of 
biotechnology by using US firms to acquire technology 
and data.27
The Trump administration is also worried about 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The initiative seeks to 
“transform its expansive energy infrastructure” through 
overland corridors and a new “Maritime Silk Road” con-
necting seaports from the South China Sea to Africa; 
these endeavors stretch across more than 70 countries, 
including Russia, Indonesia, Austria, Greece, and Saudi 
Arabia.28 The project also includes 6 trillion dollars in 
investment in clean energy generation.29 In December 
2017, in his blueprint for American national security 
policy and as an apparent response to the project, Trump 
asserted that “China is using economic inducements 
Figure 13: MFN Applied Duties (average), by Product 
Groups: The United States and China
United States China
Difference in 
Percentage 
Points
Cereal & 
preparations 3.1 23 19.9
Cotton 4.8 22 17.2
Sugars & 
confectionary 15.7 28.7 13
Animal products 2.2 14.1 11.9
Coffee, tea 3.2 14.9 11.7
Other agricultural 
products 1.1 11.9 10.8
Fish & fish 
products 0.7 10.8 10.1
Fruits, veg-
etables, plants 4.8 14.7 9.9
Manufactures, 
n.e.s. 2.2 11.7 9.5
Leather, foot-
wear, etc. 3.9 13.3 9.4
Transport 
equipment 2.9 12.3 9.4
Electrical 
machinery 1.5 8.6 7.1
Non-electrical 
machinery 1.2 8.1 6.9
Minerals & metals 1.7 7.8 6.1
Beverages & 
tobacco 18.6 23.7 5.1
Clothing 11.6 16 4.4
Chemicals 2.8 6.6 3.8
Wood, paper, 
etc. 0.5 4.1 3.6
Oilseeds, fats 
& oils 7.4 10.9 3.5
Petroleum 1.8 5.3 3.5
Textiles 7.9 9.6 1.7
Dairy products 18.3 12.3 -6
Source: WTO, <http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfile/WSDBTariffPFView.
aspx?Language=E&Country=CN,US> (accessed January 16, 2019).
Figure 14: Degree of Trade Openness: Emerging 
Economies
Simple 
Average MFN 
Applied Tariff 
Rate (2017)
Total Trade
Simple 
Average MFN 
Applied Tariff 
Rate (2017)
Agricultural 
Trade
Simple 
Average MFN 
Applied Tariff 
Rate (2017)
Non-Agricul-
tural Trade
China 9.8 15.6 8.8
Brazil 13.4 10.2 13.9
India 13.8 32.8 10.7
South Africa 7.6 8.5 7.5
Source: WTO, <http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfile/WSDBTariffPFView.aspx?L
anguage=E&Country=BR%2cCN%2cIN%2cUS%2cZA> (accessed Janu-
ary 16, 2019).
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and penalties, influence operations and implied military 
threats to persuade other states to heed its political and 
security agenda. China’s infrastructure investments and 
trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations.”30 At 
the ASEAN summit in Singapore 2018, US Vice President 
Mike Pence noted that the United States does not “offer 
a constricting belt or a one-way road.”31 Furthermore, in 
October 2018, President Trump established a new for-
eign aid agency, called the United States International 
Development Finance Corporation, with the authority 
to provide 60 billion US dollars in loans, insurance, and 
guarantees to assist infrastructure initiatives in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America.32 Pence deemed the initiative a 
way to offer “foreign nations a just and transparent alter-
native to China’s debt-trap diplomacy.”33
3.4 An Escalating Trade Conflict Verging on a Trade 
War
In late 2018, Kevin Hassett, chairman of the president’s 
Council of Economic Advisers, said China had “misbe-
haved” as a member of the WTO and hinted that there 
might be a case for ejecting China from the WTO.34 Peter 
Navarro, Trump’s director of the Office of Trade and 
Manufacturing Policy, said, “China is basically trying to 
steal the future of Japan, the US and Europe, by going 
after our technology.”35 
The Trump administration seems to believe that 
unilateral actions are necessary to ensure fair trade. The 
2018 USTR report on China’s compliance with WTO rules 
stresses, “It is simply unrealistic to believe that WTO 
enforcement actions alone can ever have a significant 
impact on an economy as large as China’s economy ... 
The notion that our problems with China can be solved 
by bringing more cases at the WTO alone is naïve at best, 
and at worst it distracts policymakers from facing the 
gravity of the challenge...”36 The Trump administration 
has thus pursued an aggressive unilateral strategy toward 
China.
On March 8, 2018, President Trump announced the im-
position of global tariffs on steel (25 percent) and alumi-
num (10 percent), based on the national security justifica-
tions of Section 232 of the Trade Act of 1962. China is the 
world’s largest producer of both of these commodities 
and has substantial overcapacities, which distort world 
markets. In early July 2018, the United States imposed 
import duties of 25 percent on Chinese imports – worth 34 
billion US dollars – based on Section 301 of the Trade Act 
of 1974. The duties relate primarily to high-tech product 
groups such as aircraft parts, batteries, flat-screen televi-
sions, and specialist medical equipment – products that 
China identified as particularly important in the current 
five-year plan as part of the Made in China 2025 strategy. 
The Chinese government immediately 
implemented retaliatory tariffs cover-
ing a trade volume of around 34 billion 
US dollars. Trump turned up the heat 
by extending tariffs on imports worth 
16 billion US dollars in late August 2018. 
Again, China imposed retaliatory tariffs, 
also covering a trade volume of around 
16 billion US dollars.  
A few days after the first Section 301 
tariffs, the United States Trade Repre-
sentative published a further list with 
almost 6,000 Chinese merchandise 
goods. The list comprised a trade volume 
of 200 billion US dollars, on which duties 
of 10 percent were levied in late Septem-
ber 2018. The tariffs were to increase to 
25 percent starting on January 1, 2019. In 
total, US imports from China worth 250 
billion US dollars, or almost 50 percent 
of US goods imports from China in 2017, 
are now burdened with additional tariffs. 
Trump has repeatedly signaled that, if 
necessary, tariffs on imports worth 500 
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billion US dollars would be imposed if China did not back 
down. This corresponds to nearly all US imports from 
China. 
The conflict further escalated in late 2018 with a spat 
between the United States and China over the Chinese 
technology giant Huawei. Early in December 2018, 
Canada arrested Huawei’s Chief Financial Officer at the 
request of the United States, when she was stopping over 
at Vancouver Airport. The United States alleges that Hua-
wei used a Hong Kong shell company to sell equipment to 
Iran, thus acting in violation of US sanctions. In late-
January 2019, the US Justice Department also accused 
Huawei of the theft of trade secrets. The Chinese govern-
ment harshly criticized this move. According to Beijing, 
the “war” against Huawei had political motives and was 
an attempt by the US government to win the struggle for 
technological leadership. The Chinese foreign ministry 
stated, “The United States have been using state power to 
smear and attack specific Chinese enterprises, destroy-
ing legitimate operations of the companies.”37 In March 
2019, Huawei also sued the US government, arguing that 
Congress violated the Constitution by forbidding federal 
agencies to use the company’s technology. Late May 2019, 
reacting to the listing of Huawei on the “entity list” of the 
DOC, China announced to draw up its own list of “unreli-
able” entities.
At the G20 summit in Buenos Aires in late-2018, the 
United States and China reached a temporary ceasefire, 
at least on the tariff front. The two adversaries agreed 
to reach a deal before March 1, 2019, on several trade is-
sues, such as intellectual property protection and forced 
technology transfers, non-tariff barriers, and cyber theft 
of trade secrets. For the duration of the negotiations, they 
agreed to abstain from any further tariffs. China also 
announced the increase of imports of agricultural, energy, 
industrial, and other products from the United States to 
gradually ease the trade imbalance. 
In early January 2019, the two superpowers met in Bei-
jing to begin to tackle the details of the deal. The Trump 
administration showed optimism, although without a 
doubt this was also intended to calm the stock market. 
The Chinese government announced that it would open 
China’s market for five genetically modified crops, which 
the United States has been demanding for years. However, 
differences persisted over more complex issues, such as 
the protection of intellectual property rights and subsi-
dies to Chinese state enterprises. USTR Robert Lighthizer 
and Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross emphasized 
that China needed to commit to buying more US goods 
and services and to enacting serious reforms. They also 
asserted that any agreement needed to encompass a 
monitoring and enforcement mechanism. 
After several rounds of negotiations, Trump extended 
the March deadline,38 because the negotiations with 
China had made substantial progress, according to his 
team.39 Both sides declared that they had reached a deal 
on currency manipulation. For years, the United States 
has been criticizing China for artificially undervaluing 
its currency to foster exports. While the Renminbi had 
appreciated vis-á-vis the dollar for some years, of late, it 
had suffered losses in value again subsequent to the US-
China trade conflict. Six memorandums of understanding 
on agriculture, services, non-tariff barriers, intellectual 
property rights, forced technology transfers, and cyber-
security had been drafted, according to media reports,40 
although enforcement of these remained unclear.41 In 
addition, China had offered to increase its purchases of 
American goods by 1.2 trillion US dollar over the next six 
years and to grant further market access in some sectors.
However, in May 2019, Trump escalated the tariff 
conflict again, because China had allegedly withdrawn a 
number of commitments, namely on enforcement issues. 
As a consequence, Trump raised the tariffs on Chinese 
goods worth 200 billion US dollars from ten percent to 25 
percent. And he threatened to impose additional tariffs 
on the remaining US imports of Chinese goods. China re-
taliated with its own tariffs on US goods worth 60 billion 
US dollars. It also threatened to restrict the export of rare 
earths which are existential for the production of many 
hightech products. In a white paper, China accused the 
US of stalling the negotiations.42
The outcome of the US-China negotiations remains 
uncertain for the time being. The planned meeting of 
President Trump and Chinese President Xi has been post-
poned from April to June 2019. Trump’s tough stance has 
a lot of supporters in the United States, but not everybody 
is in favor of the tariff conflict. 
4. Support for (and Opposition of) Trump’s 
China Policy – The Public, Stakeholders, and 
Congress
4.1 US Public Opinion and the View of Stakeholders 
on China 
President Trump is not alone in perceiving China as a 
threat. According to the aforementioned Pew survey, 
there has been a general downward trend since 2011 
in the number of Americans who see China favorably, 
although there was a surprising 7 percent increase from 
2016 to 2017, perhaps as a backlash against the harsh 
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treatment of the country by President Trump in the media. 
This is illustrated in Figure 16. Younger Americans tend 
to see China more favorably than older Americans, with 
49 percent of survey participants ages 18-29 holding this 
view, compared with 37 percent of respondents ages 30-
49, and 34 percent of those over age 50. 
Figure 17 shows the key concerns regarding China. 
Thus, Americans are worried about both economic and 
political issues, including cyberattacks, the impact of 
China’s economic growth on the global environment, and 
the substantial US debt held by the country. Compared to 
2017, there was a 6 percent increase in Americans who be-
lieve that China’s economic power is a greater concern to 
the United States, and a 7 percent decrease in those who 
believe that Chinese military might is of greater concern. 
This could correspond to the increase in rhetoric from the 
Trump administration regarding the trade deficit with 
China and unfair trade practices.
There are marked partisan differences that become 
apparent in Figure 18: Republican respondents tend to be 
more worried about the threat posed by China’s economic 
strength (American debt held by China, loss of US jobs, 
the trade deficit), while Democrats are more concerned 
with China’s impact on the global environment, on hu-
man rights, and the tensions between China and Taiwan. 
Again, this does not only reflect convictions but is also 
influenced by President Trump’s rhetoric, as well as by 
support for (or opposition of) Trump. 
Public opinion on Trump’s trade policy measures 
vis-á-vis China is much less decisive, on the other hand. 
Specifically, according to a Gallup poll on the first round 
of tariffs imposed between the United States and China in 
July 2018, more than twice as many Americans believed 
that the tariffs would hurt the US economy than those 
who believed they would help it, while nearly the same 
number believed the tariffs would have no effect. Also, 45 
percent of respondents predicted that the tariffs would 
have adverse long-term effects on the economy compared 
with 31 percent who foresaw positive effects; in this case, 
only 19 percent believed they would have no effect on the 
economy.
Again, respondents are divided along partisan lines. As 
shown in Figure 19, more Republicans than Democrats 
anticipated short-term positive effects for their family’s 
financial situation (11 percent to 2 percent), and more 
Republicans than Democrats (28 percent to 5 percent) 
believed tariffs were helpful to the US economy. Addition-
ally, 23 percent of Democrats polled foresaw negative 
effects for their familial financial standing, compared 
with 7 percent of Republicans, and notably, 57 percent 
of Democrats found the tariffs to be detrimental to the 
American economy, compared to only 16 percent of Re-
publicans polled. 
Regarding long-term effects (Figure 20), these differ-
ences become even more pronounced. Here, Republican 
respondents believed that tariffs would have positive 
effects for their familial financial standing and for the US 
economy (39 percent and 62 percent respectively), while, 
respectively, only 7 percent and 12 percent Democrats 
shared this view. On the other hand, 56 percent and 72 
percent of Democratic respondents, re-
spectively, predicted detrimental impacts 
on their family’s financial situation and 
for the American economy, compared to 12 
percent and 17 percent of Republicans. 
When controlling for other factors, 
including employment status, region, 
level of education, income levels and how 
closely one followed the news on tariffs, 
differences were either inconsequential or 
inconsistent. Partisan affiliation seems to 
be the only strongly significant predictor 
of opinion on the tariffs. This can partially 
be attributed to the partisan polariza-
tion in the United States – currently at an 
all-time high – but it remains an interest-
ing new trend as traditionally, Democrats 
were more skeptical towards free trade 
while being more open for protectionist 
measures than Republicans. As for how far 
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Figure 16: American Opinions on China  
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this will affect trade policy decision-making in Congress 
remains to be seen.
The business community is strongly critical of Trump’s 
trade policy but shares many of his administration’s 
concerns regarding China at the same time. The US 
Chamber of Commerce, for example, which represents a 
broad range of American business interests, has taken a 
clear stance against the Trump administration’s tariffs on 
Chinese imports, as well as those on steel and aluminum, 
referring to them as “the wrong approach to address un-
fair trade practices.”43 At the same time, the association 
also called for more cooperation with “allies to apply pres-
sure on China and use the tools provided by US trade and 
international laws that we helped create.”44 Jay Simmons, 
the president of the National Association of Manufactur-
ers (the largest manufacturing association in the United 
States), also called for a return to the rules-based trading 
system and warned of economic consequences, at the 
expense of manufacturing workers in particular.45
American unions have a somewhat different position, 
being much more skeptical in general about free trade. 
The president of the largest union in the United States, 
the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations (AFL-CIO), Richard Trumka, supports 
the president’s trade policy, emphasizing, “I think he’s 
going in the right direction on trade.”46 At the same time, 
he warns that the administration’s tariff policies needed 
to work in favor of working families.47 In a tweet, he said 
that Congress and the president needed to work together 
“for smart tariff & trade policies that put working families 
first.” While he warns that tariffs might have gone too far 
regarding key allies of the United States – such as Canada 
– the AFL-CIO supports a tough stance on China.
Since China is ranked as the second-most important 
export market for US agricultural products, farmers have 
been severely impacted by the imposition of additional 
tariffs. The average farm income has fall-
en to a near 15-year low under President 
Trump, and farm debt is nearing the high 
levels of the 1980s. As such, the number 
of farm bankruptcies is rising quickly. 
The American Farm Bureau Federation 
(AFBF, one of the oldest and biggest 
associations of farmers) has therefore 
been critical of Trump’s trade measures. 
In its statement to the Senate Agricul-
ture Committee, the AFBF specified that 
90 percent of US agricultural exports 
to China had already been subject to 
retaliatory measures. The organization 
thus urged US trade officials to “engage 
in discussions with our trade partners to 
resolve trade concerns before resorting 
to tariffs.”48 In early February 2019, hun-
dreds of farmers came to Washington 
to speak out in opposition to the trade 
conflict.49 Farmers were also highly 
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Figure 17: Key American Concerns about China (2018)
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critical of Trump’s most recent tariff hike. The President 
attempted to appease the agricultural sector by promising 
financial aid – but farmers emphasised that they rather 
have export markets than government assistance.
The risks of Trump’s trade policy are significant. How-
ever, has this led to a change in voting behavior in the last 
midterm elections, which took place in November 2018? 
The Brookings Institution identified the following sectors 
most at risk to job losses above 100,000 jobs due to retalia-
tory measures abroad: plastics manufacturing, aircraft 
manufacturing, pharmaceutical manufacturing, fruit and 
nut tree farming, animal slaughtering (excepting poultry), 
and automobile manufacturing. Other sectors at risk for 
substantial job losses included wineries, breweries, corn 
farming, pork producers, tobacco manufacturing, and 
soybean farming. This analysis highlighted the geograph-
ical effects, with substantial potential job losses across 
rural and Midwestern states – particu-
larly in Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, Illinois, 
and Pennsylvania – affecting the tradi-
tional manufacturing base of automobile 
production, as well as production hubs 
for corn and soybeans. The (potential) 
losses of employment were divided al-
most equally between states that Donald 
Trump won in 2016 and those won by 
Hillary Clinton. On a county level, the 
numbers suggests more counties won by 
Trump to be affected (82 percent) than 
those won by Clinton (18 percent). 
Out of the ten states most affected 
by retaliatory measures, the Democrats 
won only one back in the 2018 midterms: 
Minnesota, with 41,122 affected jobs. 
In Pennsylvania (78,721 affected jobs 
according to Brookings) and Michigan 
(100,929 affected jobs), the Republicans 
defended the Senate and House, but 
the Democrats were able to reduce the 
margin. Thus, despite its risks to the 
national economy, Trump’s trade policy 
seems not to have had a major impact on 
the voting behavior in the most recent 
midterm elections. 
To sum this up, many Americans view 
China as a threat – economically and 
politically. As such, President Trump has 
a strong basis for his aggressive behav-
ior toward China. While many sectors 
(business and farmers) already feel the 
negative consequences of protectionism, so far, pressure 
has not been high enough to induce a policy change. But 
does Trump also have the support of Congress?
4.2 US Congress: How Republicans and Democrats 
View China
In Congress, views on China are fairly consistent across 
party lines. That Congress is critical of China is nothing 
new (there have been repeated attempts to classify China 
as currency manipulator in the past). However, bipartisan 
support for a more aggressive policy towards the country 
has increased considerably of late.  
Many prominent Democrats agree with Trump regard-
ing China’s unfair trade practices. Ahead of the G20 Sum-
mit late 2018, Democratic Senate Minority Leader Chuck 
Schumer (D-NY), Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), and Sena-
tor Sherrod Brown (D-OH) criticized China’s “predatory” 
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practices and urged the president to continue to act ag-
gressively against Chinese “efforts to steal and extort US 
intellectual property.”50 According to Schumer, “China is 
our real trade enemy, and their theft of intellectual prop-
erty and their refusal to let our companies compete fairly 
threatens millions of future American jobs.”51 Democratic 
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) called the 
tariffs a “leverage point,” stating that the United States 
“must take strong, smart, and strategic action against 
China’s brazenly unfair trade policies.” She also spoke out 
against human rights violations in China,52 as did Sena-
tor Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), who criticized Chinese 
currency manipulation, economic “weaponization,” and 
rising power, saying that the country is “using economic 
might to bludgeon its way onto the world stage.”53 An-
other Democratic presidential hopeful, Kamala Harris 
(D-CA), introduced a new Senate bill in December 2018 
to broaden American prosecutors’ ability to fight Chinese 
intellectual property theft and hacking.54 Finally, former 
presidential candidate and Independent Bernie Sanders 
(I-VT), who usually votes with the Democrats, has be-
moaned the loss of American manufacturing jobs due to 
the trade deficit with China, advocating a hardline posi-
tion to reduce Chinese dumping and government subsidi-
zation.55 However, there are also some critical Democratic 
voices, including the new Democratic Chairman of the 
House Ways and Means Committee, Richard Neal (D-MS), 
who criticized the seemingly erratic imposition of tariffs 
on Chinese goods by the Trump administration. Similarly, 
the new chairman of the Ways and Means Committee’s 
subcommittee for trade, Earl Blumenauer (D-OR), has 
also questioned the rationale of additional tariffs, say-
ing, “Tariffs are not just magically imposed on somebody 
else; it’s a cost of doing business, it affects what happens 
with American manufacturers, and in retail, and they are 
ultimately paid by the consumer.”56 
Many Republicans also share Trump’s views on China, 
with House Republicans, in particular, seeming to be in 
line with the president, while Republican Senators appear 
to be a bit more nuanced in their opinion.57 Senate Major-
ity Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and Chuck Grassley 
(R-IA), Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, for 
example, have argued that the United States must act ag-
gressively towards China. Grassley, in particular, released 
a statement calling China an “existential threat” and 
alleging that the country “poses a threat to our economies, 
our innovation, our businesses and our very standing in 
the world.”58 At the same time, Grassley represents one of 
the United States’ largest agricultural states. China and 
other countries have targeted US farmers with tariffs in 
retaliation for Trump’s trade policies. “The United States 
should take action to defend its interests when any for-
eign nation isn’t playing by the rules or refuses to police 
itself. But farmers and ranchers shouldn’t be expected to 
bear the brunt of retaliation for the entire country. It’s 
not fair, and it doesn’t make economic sense,” Grassley 
criticized.59 Senators Mitt Romney (R-UT), Bob Corker (R-
TN), and Orrin Hatch (R-UT) have all voiced opinions in 
opposition to the tariffs.60 However, going against Trump 
will not be easy for Republicans, particularly as the next 
elections are coming closer. Trump is likely to frame any 
congressional opposition to his trade agenda as favoring 
China over America – a narrative no Senator or Represen-
tative up for election can afford. He already uses patrio-
tism to justify the current hardship for farmers, calling 
them “our great patriot farmers”.
Two 2018 legislative reforms on investment screening 
and export control, both passed within the National De-
fense Authorization Act (NDAA), underline the bipartisan 
support for a strong stance on China.61 The law was voted 
in favor of by 220 Republican and 131 Democrat House 
Representatives (including Speaker of the House Nancy 
Pelosi), while seven Republicans and 59 Democrats voted 
nay.62 In the Senate, the NDAA was voted in favor of by 
87 Senators and against by 10 Senators. Trump signed the 
law in August 2018.
Foreign investment has been subject to screening 
by the government since 1975 in the United States for 
national security reasons. The audits are carried out 
by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (CFIUS), a collaboration of various departments 
and authorities, chaired by the US Treasury Department. 
If CFIUS concludes that an investment could jeopardize 
national security, the panel can submit the case to the 
president for a decision. The decision of the president is 
legally binding. Under the old legislation, investments by 
foreign companies could be audited if they led to control 
of the acquired company. With the Foreign Investment 
Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), Congress 
passed a reform package that significantly expands the 
powers of CFIUS. Covered transactions now include real 
estate acquisitions in sensitive areas and non-passive but 
non-controlling investments in US businesses involving 
sensitive personal data, critical infrastructure, or critical 
technology. In addition, investments that are designed to 
circumvent investment screening are subject to review. 
From 2008 to 2016, CFIUS audited 364 acquisitions, with 
only two of these investigations banning acquisitions. In 
2017, CFIUS reviewed nearly 250 cases, an increase of 40 
percent in relation to 2016 alone.63  As of now, there are 
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no official figures available for 2018, but the caseload 
seems to have remained high.
The reform of the US export control law was met with 
similar support. Congress had not renewed the Export 
Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 since it expired in 1994. 
President Clinton and his successors relied on the Interna-
tional Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977 to 
maintain US export control law in the absence of any le-
gal basis. IEEPA allows the White House to impose a state 
of emergency because of an “unusual and extraordinary 
threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part 
outside the United States, to the national security, foreign 
policy, or economy of the United States.”64 The Export 
Controls Act (ECA) repeals most of the EAA, providing 
a new statutory basis for export controls. It explicitly re-
quires the president to use export controls to maintain US 
economic leadership in science and engineering, industry, 
and basic research. Furthermore, the ECA transfers the 
competence for export control – for example, the listing of 
goods, the identification of persons perceived as a threat 
to US national security, the monitoring of the export of 
controlled goods, or the granting of exemptions – per-
manently to the president. The ECA instructs the admin-
istration to create a cross-departmental body under the 
direction of the DOC.65 This panel is to identify technolo-
gies that are relevant to national security and that are 
not already covered by FIRRMA as sensitive technologies, 
meaning “emerging and foundational technologies that 
(1) are essential to the national security of the United 
States.” Other innovations introduced by ECA include the 
establishment of a cross-ministerial review mechanism 
for existing export licenses in countries subject to arms 
embargoes, as well as a review by the DOC to estimate 
the negative effects of exports on defense-related indus-
trial capacity.
That Congress is tough on China, however, does not 
mean that all members support the trade policy powers 
of the president – in particular, the application of Sec-
tion 232 on tariffs. Under the 115th Congress, there were 
several attempts by Congress to curtail the president’s 
policy space. In July 2018, Senators Bob Corker (R-TN) 
and Pat Toomey (R-PA) had introduced non-binding 
legislation that would “provide a role for Congress in 
making a determination under section 232.” The resolu-
tion received 94 yeas and 5 nays, with broad support 
across party lines.66 Before the midterm elections, a total 
of nine legislative initiatives related to Section 232 had 
been submitted to Congress to change the reach of Sec-
tion 232 (exclusively or in conjunction with other trade 
policy initiatives). So far, none of the initiatives has led 
to further steps. In the current legislative period, Repre-
sentative Mike Gallagher (R-WI) and Senator Pat Toomey 
(R-PA) have introduced similar legislation. The Bicameral 
Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019 would require 
the president to submit any proposal that would reduce 
imports due to threats to national security under Section 
232; it would furthermore transfer investigatory authority 
on national security from the Department of Commerce 
to the Department of Defense.67 The president meanwhile 
aims to further expand his power. In late January 2019, 
Republican Representative Sean Duffy (R-WI) introduced 
the Reciprocal Trade Act, which would expand President 
Trump’s ability to impose tariffs on another country if he 
believes its tariffs and non-tariff measures to be unfair 
or too restrictive. The bill would require Congress to be 
notified of tariffs before they are imposed, but lawmakers 
would not have the power to vote on them. The initiative 
has little chance of success, however.
Bipartisan initiatives have become a rarity in Congress 
for almost a decade now. On the other hand, Congress 
shows great unity when it comes to China. A large 
majority of Representatives and Senators of both parties 
supports a tough stance toward China. While support for 
the Trump tariffs is less decisive, it remains to be seen 
whether Congress will reel in the president. For Republi-
cans, it will be difficult to go against the president in the 
run-up of the presidential elections in 2020. For Demo-
crats, it will be difficult as one of their most important 
stakeholders – the unions – is still skeptical about free 
trade, although support for trade has increased in the 
voter base of the Democrats. 
5. The United States, China, and the WTO
5.1 US-China Trade Disputes at the WTO
Between 2001 and 2018, the United States filed 63 
dispute settlement cases before the WTO against 16 
countries and the European Union, with the highest num-
ber (23) against China, followed by nine against the EU 
(Figure 21). In contrast, in the same time period, China 
has filed only 22 cases against three countries and the Eu-
ropean Union, 15 of which were against the United States 
(Figure 22). Figure 23 shows the annual complaints by the 
United States and China respectively from 2008 to 2018.
Contrary to the rhetoric of the Trump administration, 
the United States was quite successful in the WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings involving China. The United 
States has won three out of six disputes that China initi-
ated, despite the fact that the complainant usually has a 
very strong case (Figure 25). The United States also won 
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seven out of eight disputes that it initiated against China 
(Figure 26).
Of the dispute settlement cases filed by the United 
States against China, ten (43 percent) involved viola-
tions of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT, 1994), the article that deals with 
anti-dumping remedies, and of the Agreement of Sub-
sidies and Countervailing Measures (otherwise known 
as the SCM Agreement), which covers illegal subsidies 
and countervailing. Most of the cases filed by the United 
States covered the aluminum, automobile, wind power, 
and steel industries. The other 13 cases filed by the United 
States against China primarily cited violations of the 
GATT (1994) and the General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices (GATS), the Accession Protocol, and the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). The GATT violations dealt primarily with the 
agricultural and aircraft sectors, as well as raw materi-
als; the GATS violations covered electronic payment and 
financial services; and all TRIPS violations were filed in 
reference to intellectual property rights and protections. 
More than half of the cases filed by China against the 
United States – eight cases (53 percent) – cited violations 
of Article VI of GATT, also addressing the methodologies, 
such as zeroing, used by the United States in anti-dump-
ing proceedings against China. To determine the dumping 
margin, the foreign domestic price (FDP) of the product 
is compared with its US import price (USIP) adjusted for 
transportation and handling costs. If FDP minus USIP is 
less than zero, the United States sets the negative differ-
ence at zero – called zeroing. This can inflate the actual 
dumping margin and subsequently the applied anti-
dumping duties. 
The United States has been the respondent in 16 WTO 
disputes related to this issue.68 In 2013, for example, 
China initiated a dispute against the United States (with 
third parties including Canada, the European Union, 
India, Brazil, Japan, Korea, Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Ukraine, Vietnam, Turkey, and Taiwan) complaining of 
zeroing in three anti-dumping investigations against Chi-
nese exporters. The WTO panel ultimately agreed with 
China in 2016. The United States did agree to implement 
the Dispute Settlement Body’s recommendations in a way 
compliant with WTO obligations, and in arbitration, the 
reasonable time period to do so was fixed at 15 months, 
expiring at the end of August 2018. In September 2018, 
China requested Dispute Settlement Body authorization 
to “suspend concessions or other obligations pursuant to 
22.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) on 
the grounds that the United States had failed to comply 
with the DSB’s recommendations and ruling within the 
reasonable period of time,” to which the United States 
objected. The matter has been referred to arbitration as of 
September 2018.69 For years, the WTO’s ruling on US anti-
dumping tariffs has been one of the central reasons for US 
frustration with the organization. However, in April 2019, 
a WTO panel finally accepted the US practice of zeroing 
in a case concerning Canadian softwood lumber – despite 
Figure 21: WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, Initiated by 
and Initiated against the United States (2001-2018)
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Figure 22: WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, Initiated by 
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previous Appellate Body rulings. But it is unlikely, that 
this changes the basic US attitude towards the WTO.70 
Figure 26 provides an overview of the annual anti-dump-
ing and countervailing cases involving the United States 
and China from 2005 to 2018.
Another conflictual issue between the United States 
and China is the country’s status as a (non-) market 
economy. The United States has treated China as a non-
market economy (NME) for trade remedy investigations 
since 1981, meaning that the DOC does not believe it 
“operates on market principles of cost or pricing structures, 
so that sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect 
the fair value of the merchandise.”71 When China joined 
the WTO in 2001, the country was deemed a non-market 
economy. The country’s Accession Protocol thus granted 
other WTO members the right to continue to use an 
alternative (surrogate country) methodology for assess-
ing prices and costs of products. As prices are not market-
based in a non-market economy, it is difficult to determine 
the dumping margin. In this case, a surrogate country can 
be used to construct a product’s “normal value.” China 
is of the opinion that its Accession Protocol required all 
WTO members to terminate their use of this alternative 
methodology by December 11, 2016. The United States 
does not agree with this interpretation. 
In December 2016, China initiated WTO dispute 
settlement cases against the United States and the EU 
for classifying the country as a non-market economy in 
anti-dumping proceedings. China claimed the measures 
to be in violation of Articles 2.1, 2.2, 9.2, 18.1, and 18.4 of 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Articles I:1, VI:1, and VI:2 
of the GATT, and Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agree-
ment (against the United States)72 and in the case of the 
EU, with Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agree-
ment and Articles I:1 and VI:1 of the GATT.73 A panel was 
established as of July 2017 in the EU case, but not yet in 
the US case. Moreover, the United States signed on as a 
third party in opposition to the WTO case against the Eu-
ropean Union.74 In this submission, the USTR explained 
that Article VI of the GATT allowed countries to reject 
prices or costs in anti-dumping investigations if the data 
had not been collected under market economy condi-
tions.75 USTR Lighthizer warned that a decision against 
the United States on that matter would be “cataclysmic for 
the WTO.”76 The Trump administration did not stop there. 
In order to constrain China’s influence, the United States 
included a “non-market economy” clause into the USMCA, 
meaning if any party to the agreement enters into a free 
trade agreement with a non-market economy, the others 
would be able to terminate the agreement and opt for a 
bilateral one instead.77 
In 2018 alone, China filed as many complaints as never 
before against the United States. The most prominent 
cases are the dispute over US steel and aluminum tariffs 
and US 301 duties. Shortly after the announcement of US 
steel and aluminum tariffs, China requested consulta-
tions with the WTO on April 5, 2018, with 28 third parties 
including Brazil, Canada, Egypt, the European Union, 
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Russia, 
South Africa, and Switzerland. The complaint noted the 
measures’ inconsistency with Articles I:1, II:1(a), II:1(b), 
X:3(a), XIX:1(a), and XIX:2 of the GATT, as well as Articles 
2.1, 2.2, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 7, 11.1(a), 12.1, 12.2, and 12.3 of the 
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Figure 23: WTO Complaints of the United States and 
China; 2001 - 2018
Figure 24: Statistical Evaluation of Disputes (Absolute 
and Percentages of total Bilateral Disputes Initiated by 
China): China against the United States; 2001-2018
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Figure 25: Statistical Evaluation of Disputes (Absolute 
and Percentages of total Bilateral Disputes Initiated 
by the United States): The Unites States against China; 
2001-2018
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Agreement on Safeguards. A panel was established on 
January 25, 2019.78
In March 2018, President Trump signed the Memo-
randum on Actions by the United States Related to the 
Section 301 Investigation, focusing on Chinese “economic 
aggression” in technology licensing and technology 
and intellectual property transfers.79 The United States 
launched a respective case at the WTO later that month, 
because – according to the United States – Chinese licens-
ing practices were inconsistent with Articles 3, 28.1(a), 
28.1(b), and 28.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. As of Janu-
ary 2019, the WTO established a panel. Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, Egypt, the EU, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, 
New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, Turkey, and Ukraine are third parties in the 
case.80
China quickly retaliated, initiating its own dispute set-
tlement case in early April 2018 against the United States, 
focusing on the 25 percent tariff increase on imports from 
China.81 China asserts that these tariffs are inconsistent 
with Articles I:1, II:1(a), and II:1(b) of the GATT and 
Article 23 of the DSU Agreement. After several rounds of 
additional consultations requested by China and several 
communications circulated by the United States noting 
disagreement regarding WTO compatibility, a panel was 
established in late-January 2019. Brazil, Canada, the EU, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, New Zealand, 
Norway, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Ukraine joined 
as third parties.82 Moreover, China initiated additional 
WTO proceedings against the United States in late-August 
2018 regarding the second round of US tariffs, citing the 
violation of the same articles.83
These cases show that the United States and China 
have a long history of WTO disputes, which precede the 
current trade tensions. They also show that the United 
States was quite successful in dealing with specific con-
cerns regarding China’s economic and trade policy in the 
framework of the WTO system – contrary to President 
Trump’s claims. Lastly, the cases show that many of the 
US concerns with Chinese behavior, as well as with the 
WTO itself, go back for years. 
5.2 The United States, China, and WTO Reform
Much of the Trump administration’s criticism of the WTO 
comes back to the role of China in the organization. In 
the 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, 
the USTR boldly comments that China’s membership in 
the WTO was a mistake, stating “China largely remains a 
state-led economy today, and the United States and other 
trading partners continue to encounter serious problems 
with China’s trade regime. Meanwhile, China has used 
the imprimatur of WTO membership to become a domi-
nant player in international trade. Given these facts, it 
seems clear that the United States erred in supporting 
China’s entry into the WTO on terms that have proven 
to be ineffective in securing China’s embrace of an open, 
market-oriented trade regime.”84
The Trump administration has four points of conten-
tion with the organization.85 First, it is very dissatisfied 
with the dispute settlement system of the organization, 
in particular, the Appellate Body. The dispute settlement 
function is one of the crown jewels of the WTO. The 
concerns of the United States, as listed in the 2018 Trade 
Policy Agenda, relate to the disregard for the 90-day 
deadline for appeals (Art. 17.5), continued service by per-
sons who are no longer Appellate Body members (Rule 
15), the issuing of advisory opinions on issues that are not 
necessary for the solution of the dispute, and the claim 
that the Appellate Body reports are entitled to be treated 
as precedents (judicial overreach).86 
As described above, the United States is also irritated 
with the rulings of the Appellate Body regarding US 
anti-dumping measures and the method of zeroing. This 
was reinforced in mid-February 2019 when a WTO panel 
authorized Korea to retaliate against the United States. 
Korea had won a WTO case against the United States in 
2016, with the Appellate Body ruling that zeroing was a 
violation of WTO rules. Korea was authorized to retaliate 
on 84.5 million US dollars’ worth of trade. Furthermore, 
the ruling also included a sanctions formula, which 
Korea can use for retaliation if the United States uses this 
methodology in future anti-dumping investigations.87 
However, the recent WTO panel ruling from April 2019 
could reverse this trend by accepting the US method of 
calculating anti-dumping margins. This might not be 
enough to change the US attitude towards the DSB, but it 
might be one step towards a more constructive dialogue 
on this issue.
In September 2018, the EU proposed concrete measures 
on how to address US criticism related to faster appeal 
proceedings, an increase of members on the Appellate 
Body from seven to nine to increase efficiency, transi-
tional rules for an outgoing member, and the narrowing 
of the scope of rulings.88 The EU was successful in gaining 
support from other WTO members for its proposals. The 
EU proposal is now officially sponsored by eleven other 
countries, including China, Canada, India, Australia, 
South Korea, Singapore, and Mexico. So far, the United 
States has objected to the reform proposals – as such, the 
conflict about the Appellate Body remains unsolved. The 
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United States seems – in the end – to oppose an interna-
tional body, which supposedly hampers its ability to fight 
dumping and hidden subsidies of non-market economies 
such as China. If the United States continues to block the 
appointment of members to the Appellate Body, there 
will be fewer than three members left in December 2019, 
which is the minimum required for an appeal. Without a 
functioning Appellate Body, any party to a dispute may 
attempt to block the adoption of panel rulings by appeal-
ing them. As such, the whole WTO dispute settlement 
process is undermined.
Second, the Trump administration complains that the 
WTO is not adequately equipped to deal with the funda-
mental economic challenges posed by China, foremost its 
trade-distorting subsidies and SOEs. This frustration has 
been exacerbated by the rulings of the Appellate Body. 
In its March 2011 ruling on Chinese SOEs and the use of 
anti-dumping and countervailing measures, the Appellate 
Body issued a very narrow definition of what constitutes 
a “public body.” Contrary to US reasoning, the ruling 
states that a “public body” needs to “posses, exercise, or 
be vested with governmental authority.” This does not 
cover SOEs, although they are controlled by the Chinese 
government. The United States claims that this very 
restrictive definition reduces the scope of the WTO Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) 
and puts an additional burden on the country that wants 
to implement countervailing duties to provide adequate 
data.89
The EU and Japan share the concerns regarding 
China’s trade-distortive practices. In response, the three 
partners founded a Trilateral Initiative at the WTO Min-
isterial Conference in Buenos Aires, in December 2017.90 
On January 9, 2019, EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia 
Malmström, USTR Robert Lighthizer, 
and Japanese Minister of Commerce and 
Trade Hiroshige Seko met once again in 
Washington, agreeing to deepen cooper-
ation in the areas of industrial subsidies, 
third-country non-market-compliant 
practices, forced technology transfer, 
e-commerce/digitized trade, and WTO 
reform. The three partners are, however, 
yet to table a joint proposal how to deal 
with subsidies and SOEs.
Third, the United States is disap-
pointed with the negotiating pillar of the 
WTO, namely the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA). Apart from the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement, WTO members 
have failed to agree on any kind of multilateral liberal-
ization agreement for more than 17 years. The United 
States has since lost interest in the multilateral negotia-
tion round, as large emerging market economies such as 
China and India failed to offer any ambitious concessions 
in areas of economic interest to the United States. As a 
result, the DDA dealt mainly with developing issues. The 
Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires in December 2017 
was therefore a breakthrough, because members such as 
the United States and others broke with the concept of 
the single undertaking of the DDA and opened the way 
for plurilateral agreements in the areas of e-commerce, 
investment facilitation, and Micro, Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprises (MSMEs). The United States welcomed 
this decision. USTR Lighthizer said, “MC11 will be re-
membered as the moment when the impasse at the WTO 
was broken. Many members recognized that the WTO 
must pursue a fresh start in key areas so that like-minded 
WTO Members and their constituents are not held back 
by the few Members that are not ready to act.”91 The 
plurilateral agreements are one way forward to keep the 
United States engaged and to negotiate modern trade 
rules that better reflect today’s trade realities. But even 
the plurilateral way does not guarantee success. While 
the United States is part of the e-commerce talks (at the 
end of January, a group of members announced that ne-
gotiations would be launched soon), it has yet to join the 
initiative on MSMEs and investment facilitation. Further-
more, the e-commerce negotiations promise to be difficult. 
The United States repeatedly warned that it would only 
sign up to an ambitious deal, which might prove hard to 
achieve given members’ different preferences regarding 
data protection and data flows.
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A related aspect is the definition of developing coun-
tries. The WTO has no criteria differentiating between 
developing and industrialized countries. Rather, mem-
bers self-determine their development status. As a con-
sequence, large emerging economies such as China (but 
also Brazil, Argentina, India, Russia, and many others) 
are still treated as developing countries and, thus, benefit 
from special and differential treatment. This means, for 
example, longer periods to phase in obligations and more 
lenient obligations. In September 2018, the United States, 
together with the EU and Japan, advocated that advanced 
WTO members “undertake full commitments in ongoing 
and future WTO negotiations.”92 
In January 2019, the United States criticized special 
and differential treatment as “simplistic and clearly out-
dated” in a communication sent to WTO members. The 
communication noted China’s Human Development Index 
score as above the global average and highlighted China’s 
significant GDP growth over the past two decades.93 As a 
follow-up, on February 15th, the United States proposed 
four criteria to determine whether WTO members should 
receive special and differential treatment within a draft 
General Council decision. WTO members who are also 
members of the OECD or the G20, classified as “high 
income” by the World Bank, or account for “no less than 
0.5 per cent of global merchandise trade (imports and ex-
ports)” should not qualify as developing countries under 
the proposal. Accordingly, many WTO members would no 
longer receive special treatment, including China, India, 
South Korea, South Africa, Singapore, Israel, Mexico, 
Indonesia, and Chile. According to the United States, the 
proposal would serve to “strengthen the negotiating 
function of the WTO to produce high-standard, recipro-
cal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed 
to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers 
to trade.”94 The majority of countries perceive the US 
proposal as very confrontational. It is therefore unlikely 
to gather consensus at the WTO.
In May 2019, China also issued a proposal on WTO re-
forms. However, although the country stresses that it sup-
ports the necessary reforms to strengthen the authority 
and effectiveness of the WTO, it opposes any changes to 
its status as a developing country. In the proposal China 
focuses on agricultural subsidies by developed countries 
(such as the US) while at the same time objecting to any 
restrictive regulations against SOEs.95 
A fourth point of contention for the United States is 
the unwillingness of WTO members – and again, China 
is at the top of the list – to comply with the notification 
requirements. The United States, together with the EU 
and Japan, has warned that the present lack of transpar-
ency regarding subsidies has undermined the ability of 
the WTO committees to properly fulfill their monitoring 
function. Therefore, the US introduced a transparency 
and notification proposal at the WTO Council on Trade in 
Goods, which is co-sponsored by the EU, Japan, Argen-
tina, Australia, Costa Rica and Taiwan. Canada and New 
Zealand are the latest members joining the initiative.96 
This is a first step to improve the monitoring function. 
However, in the end, the WTO members must update the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
The WTO has three functions: reduction of trade bar-
riers through trade negotiations (negotiation function), 
setting rules for global trade (rules-setting function), and 
monitoring and enforcement (enforcement function). The 
United States has highlighted severe deficiencies in all 
three of them. It has been a long time since WTO mem-
bers have agreed on more market access, and the rules of 
the organization do not sufficiently reflect the realities of 
21st century trade. The most pressing issue is the reform 
of the dispute settlement procedure. The EU agrees with 
many of the US criticisms. However, it pursues a more 
cooperative approach. The United States, on the other 
hand, has yet to present meaningful and realistic reform 
proposals.  
6. The (un)holy Triangle: The United States, 
China, and the European Union 
High-ranking members of the Trump administration have 
repeatedly hinted that the EU’s behavior toward China is 
a test for the usefulness of the transatlantic alliance.
The Trump administration has repeatedly called on the 
EU and its members to penalize China’s trade distorting 
policies more forcefully. Both USTR Lighthizer and his 
predecessor, Michael Froman, criticized the EU for re-
forming its anti-dumping legislation, which – in the view 
of the United States – indirectly accepted China’s market 
economy status in the WTO. The Trump administration 
would like the EU to more actively use anti-dumping 
and countervailing measures against China and advo-
cates that the EU implements more stringent investment 
screening. Most recently, the United States has also put 
pressure on the EU not to allow Huawei to invest in 5G. 
The United States warns that China could use the com-
pany as a backdoor into telecom and computer networks, 
increasing the risk of cyberattacks and espionage. “We 
want to keep critical infrastructure in the Western world 
out of Chinese malign influence,” the US ambassador to 
the EU, Gordon Sonderland, argued.97 US Secretary of 
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State Mike Pompeo made the same point during his Euro-
pean tour in mid-February 2019, such as cautioning allies 
in Hungary against deploying equipment from Huawei, 
saying it would make it more difficult for Washington 
to “partner alongside them.”98 In his speech at the 2019 
Munich Security Conference, Vice President Mike Pence 
reiterated this warning, “The United States has also been 
very clear with our security partners on the threat posed 
by Huawei and other Chinese telecom companies, as Chi-
nese law requires them to provide Beijing’s vast security 
apparatus with access to any data that touches their net-
work or equipment. We must protect our critical telecom 
infrastructure, and America is calling on all our security 
partners to be vigilant and to reject any enterprise that 
would compromise the integrity of our communications 
technology or our national security systems.”99
The EU shares many of the US concerns vis-à-vis China, 
such as subsidies and forced technology transfers. This 
is also one of the reasons why the EU is working together 
with the United States and Japan in the context of the 
Trilateral Initiative. As mentioned above, the EU has 
tabled a WTO reform proposal that closely pays regard 
to the interests of the United States. For instance, the EU 
proposed a more realistic differentiation between WTO 
members according to their development stage. The EU 
also cosponsored the above-mentioned far-reaching pro-
posal on notification enforcement with the United States, 
which features strong enforcement and sanction mecha-
nisms – a considerable break from the EU’s traditional 
cooperative approach.
Moreover, the discourse in the EU regarding China is 
undergoing considerable change from China as a partner 
to China as an economic competitor and economic rival. 
Only a few years back, hopes were still high that China 
would eventually open up and become a market economy. 
“The Council sees major opportunities for cooperation 
with China, in particular contributing to creating jobs 
and growth in the European Union, engaging China in its 
reform process in a way which ensures openness, a level 
playing field, and genuine mutual benefits,” the Coun-
cil of the European Union concluded in 2016.100 These 
hopes have been disappointed. All recent trends show 
that China is moving in the opposite direction in many 
regards.101 In March 2019, the European Commission thus 
presented a strategic outlook on the EU-China relation-
ship with a much harsher tone, calling China “an eco-
nomic competitor in the pursuit of technological leader-
ship, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of 
governance.”102 The strategy was endorsed by the Euro-
pean Council on March 21-22, 2019. The Commission aims 
to restore an economic level playing field with China and 
to address the country’s trade-distorting measures. 103 The 
EU-China summit early-April 2019 built on this strategy. 
China agreed to work on WTO reform, on new rules for 
industrial subsidies, and to achieve fair competition in the 
bilateral economic relationship. This is an important step 
forward but concrete steps and dates for implementation 
are missing. The EU therefore needs keep up pressure on 
China.
Another expression of the changing outlook on China 
is the EU’s new strategy to improve connectivity between 
Europe and Asia through transport links, energy, and 
human and digital networks, presented in September 
2018 – without doubt a reaction to China’s OBOR.104 The 
same month, the European Parliament passed a resolu-
tion on China. While it emphasizes the cooperative nature 
of the bilateral relationship, its tone is more critical and 
assertive. For example, it calls on EU members that are 
participating in the 16+1 format to ensure that their 
participation does not prevent the EU from having one 
voice in its relationship with China. 16+1 is an initiative 
by China to intensify and expand cooperation with 11 EU 
Member States and 5 Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Monte-
negro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia) 
in the fields of investments, transport, finance, science, 
education, and culture. The Parliament also calls on 
these countries “to carry out sound analysis and scrutiny 
of suggested infrastructure projects involving all the 
stakeholders and to ensure no compromising of national 
and European interests for short-term financial support 
and long-term commitments to Chinese involvement in 
strategic infrastructure projects and potentially greater 
political influence, which would undermine the EU’s com-
mon positions on China.”105 The EU has many concerns 
regarding transparency, respect of rules, labor rights, and 
human rights.
The question of how much access EU members should 
grant Chinese companies when it comes to critical infra-
structure also concerns information networks such as 
5G. EU members have not imposed outright bans against 
Huawei as the United States has. The European approach 
to Chinese tech companies is a mixture of small and large 
restrictions, which include some partial network security 
measures, but not a complete ban.106 French President 
Emmanuel Macron stressed that France – in contrast to 
the US – did not want to start a trade or tech war. Howev-
er, Italy has updated its trade defense laws to make a ban 
against Huawei possible. This is the strongest European 
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response so far. The debate is undoubtedly heating up. 
Many EU member states – including Germany, Poland, 
and others – want a European solution on how to coordi-
nate the security of 5G networks. In late-March 2019, the 
European Commission presented a timeline for EU coun-
tries to improve security procedures: EU countries are 
to conduct national risk assessments until June 30th and 
submit them by mid-July 2019. The EU is also conducting 
its own risk assessment to be finished by October 2019. By 
the end of the year, the Commission hopes that EU-wide 
measures to mitigate risks could be agreed upon.107 In 
addition, European Justice Commissioner, Věra Jourová, 
also proposed in April that the EU and the United States 
(possibly together with Japan) should regulate artificial 
intelligence, 5G security, and privacy together in order to 
keep control of the rules of the internet.108
The EU’s framework for screening of foreign direct in-
vestments on grounds of security or public order also has 
to be viewed in the context of the new China discourse. 
While EU members remain responsible for making deci-
sions regarding foreign investments, the new framework 
sets up a cooperation mechanism through which EU 
members and the Commission will be able to exchange 
information and raise concerns related to specific invest-
ments. In addition, it allows the Commission to issue 
opinions when an investment threatens the security or 
public order of more than one EU member. Last but not 
least, it sets certain requirements for EU members for 
investment screening at the national level. The regulation 
was published on March 21, 2019; EU members and the 
Commission have 18 months to put the necessary arrange-
ments in place.109
A further expression of the new China discourse is the 
revived debate on reciprocity in government procurement. 
While the EU’s public procurement markets are very open 
to competitors from third countries, other countries – not 
least China – are reluctant to open up to procurement 
bids from EU companies. Thus, in late-March 2019, the 
European Council called for resuming discussions on the 
EU’s International Procurement Instrument (IPI). The 
Commission had first tabled the IPI in 2012, differentiat-
ing between government procurement covered by the 
EU’s international commitments and so-called non-
covered procurement. A new procedure was to be put in 
place that would allow the EU to restrict access to the EU 
procurement market whenever public procurement in 
the originating country was substantially less open. Not 
having found the necessary support among EU members, 
the Commission presented a revised – and slightly weaker 
– proposal in early 2016. Accordingly, the Commission 
could initiate a public investigation whenever a third 
country discriminated against EU companies. If it found 
such discrimination, and consultations did not resolve 
the issue, the Commission could – as a last resort – ap-
ply a price penalty to bids from the respective country.110 
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker emphasized, 
“China is competitor, partner and rival. We need more 
reciprocity in our trade relationship. EU public procure-
ment market is one of the largest and most accessible in 
the world but [the] Chinese market is not sufficiently open 
to Europe companies. We must change this.”111
The changes on the European level mirror a greater 
threat perception in core EU member states, foremost 
Germany, which had been a long-standing supporter of 
China. In December 2018, the German federal govern-
ment had lowered the threshold for investment screen-
ing and prohibiting investments from third countries 
in the area of critical infrastructure from 25 percent to 
10 percent. In February 2019, Peter Altmaier, Minister 
of Economic Affairs and Energy, proposed a new indus-
trial plan, called “Industrial Strategy 2030 – Strategic 
Guidelines for German and European Industrial Policy,” 
to boost the competitiveness of the economy but also to 
more forcefully react to market-distortive behavior. Alt-
maier also proposed that EU members and the EU should 
review competition and merger and acquisition law at the 
national and European level and make necessary chang-
es.112 Subsequently (February 2019), France and Germany 
proposed a joint plan for industrial policy in Europe, with 
the goal of supporting local companies in competing with 
foreign rivals and to better protect key technologies from 
overseas takeovers. The two countries proposed – among 
many policies to strengthen competitiveness – “taking 
into greater consideration the state-control of and sub-
sidies for undertakings within the framework of merger 
control.”113 The debate is also intensifying in Germany 
as to whether or not access to the European government 
procurement market should be conditioned on the open-
ness – reciprocity – of other countries. While Germany 
had strongly opposed this idea in the past, there seems to 
be a change of heart among key decision-makers. 
The change in discourse and policies brings the EU and 
the United States closer together. But there are also clear 
limitations to the EU cooperating with the United States 
on China.
First, the EU has its own unresolved conflicts with 
the United States. US-EU trade relations have become 
severely strained. President Trump repeatedly called the 
EU a “foe.” Since June 2018, steel and aluminum imports 
from the EU have been subject to tariffs. Trump justifies 
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these with national security considerations but also links 
the tariffs to China. Thus, representatives of the Trump 
administration repeatedly claimed that cheap steel enter-
ing the EU also distorted competition of US businesses. In 
late-July 2018, President Trump and European Commis-
sion President Juncker agreed on a transatlantic trade 
agenda, including not only the reduction of transatlantic 
trade barriers, but also the plan to work together on WTO 
reform. The United States and the EU also committed 
to work more closely together on China. Nonetheless, 
the Trump administration continues to threaten the EU 
with tariffs on cars and car parts. In early-February 2019, 
the DOC presented President Trump with a report that 
analyzed whether imports of cars and car parts threaten 
the security of the United States (the report has to this 
date – mid-May – not been made public). One day before 
the end of the deadline for presenting the report, on May 
17, 2019, the White House issued a proclamation from the 
President announcing a 180-day delay in the decision to 
impose imminent import restrictions in the automotive 
sector.
According to the proclamation, the unpublished 232 
report concluded that (a) investment in research and 
development by US-owned automakers was critical to 
national security; b) the decline in market share of US-
owned carmakers threatened the necessary level of R & D 
investment; c) the decline in market share of US-owned 
car companies was due to imports and because protected 
foreign markets such as the European Union and Japan, 
which hampered  exports.
Based on the report, US Secretary of Commerce Wilbur 
Ross has recommended that measures be taken to adjust 
imports so that they no longer pose a threat to national 
security. One possible measure would be negotiations 
that, if successful, would allow US-owned carmakers to 
achieve long-term viability and increase R & D expendi-
tures. The President instructed the USTR, in consultation 
with other members of the administration, to enter into 
negotiations with the EU, Japan and other countries to 
avert the threat to national security. What exactly this 
means remains uncertain.
In addition, the US wants to retaliate against the EU in 
the WTO dispute over Airbus subsidies. USTR Lighthizer 
has already put together a list of EU products on which 
tariffs would be applied, adding up to a value of 11 billion 
US dollars. 
The two trading partners are also still miles away from 
launching official negotiations on a trade agreement. The 
European Commission had proposed two narrow negotia-
tion mandates for removing tariffs on industrial goods 
(including cars) and regulatory cooperation (mutual 
recognition of conformity assessment). Mid-April 2019, 
the Council finally gave the Commission a green light – 
on the basis of a majority vote. France objected to the 
mandates, demanding to link all EU trade negotiations 
to the Paris Climate Accord. Without a doubt, the French 
position has to be viewed in the context of the elections 
for the European Parliament, which French President 
Emmanuel Macron viewed as a litmus test for his party. 
Mentioning the Paris Climate Accord is a no-starter for 
the United States, which withdrew from the Accord in 
2017. The French vote does not bode well for the negotia-
tions. Another bad sign is that the European Parliament 
had voted against the two mandates in mid-March 2019. 
While the Parliament does not have to consent to the start 
of negotiations (it has to vote on the agreement during 
the ratification process), its opposition is an indicator for 
the frail consensus in the EU regarding further economic 
integration of the transatlantic partners. The negotiation 
goals of the United States, presented in January 2019, are 
much broader, covering many topics that are excluded 
from the EU agenda. Foremost, both the administration 
and Congress want to include agriculture in the talks – 
which, given the current political landscape, is hard to do 
for the EU. The transatlantic partners met in Washington 
D.C. in early May 2019 to commence talks on the mutual 
recognition of conformity assessment. Regarding indus-
trial tariffs, on the other hand, negotitions thus remain 
rather uncertain.
Second, some EU members are highly dependent on 
the Chinese market. In terms of both trade (exports) and 
foreign direct investment (outgoing), the United States 
and the European Union are dependent to a fairly similar 
extent on China. In 2017, US exports of goods and services 
to China accounted for approximately 8 percent of total 
exports of goods and services from the United States.114 In 
the same year, EU exports of goods to China comprised 
of approximately 10.5 percent of total extra-EU trade in 
goods.115 FDI flows from the EU to China were around 8 
billion euros in 2017,116 out of a total of 362 billion euros of 
outward flows,117 equating to 2.2 percent. FDI flows from 
the United States to China accounted for about 3.3 percent 
of total US FDI outward flows.118 Regarding stocks, FDI 
stocks from the EU-28 in China in 2017 made up 2.4 
percent of all FDI outward stocks, or 176 billion euros 
out of 7 trillion euros. But some EU countries are much 
more dependent: FDI stocks from Germany in China in 
2017 accounted for 13.9 percent of all German outward 
FDI stocks, or 73 billion euros out of 523 billion euros.119 
FDI stocks from the United States to China equaled 1.8 
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percent of all FDI outward stocks in 2017, or 108 billion US 
dollars out of 6 trillion US dollars.120 
Third, the EU is far away from having a unified China 
policy. EU member states, for the most part, follow their 
own national interests when dealing with China. This is 
underlined by the above-mentioned 16+1 format. Another 
example is Italy’s new stance toward Chinese investment. 
This was not only manifested in the country’s new critical 
view on an EU investment-screening framework. At the 
end of March 2019, the Italian government became the 
first G7 country to sign up to OBOR. In addition, Italy 
and China signed agreements on e-commerce and tech 
startups. This drew heavy criticism from the Trump ad-
ministration. However, Italy also introduced the hardest 
law against Huawei in Europe, which is closer to the US 
position.
Fourth, there are distinct differences between Presi-
dent Trump’s and Europe’s approaches. The EU places a 
greater emphasis on dialogue formats and multilateral 
institutions. For example, the EU has a bilateral dialogue 
in place with China on WTO reform. The EU has always 
stressed that there is no alternative to solving trade 
conflicts though the WTO, condemning the unilateral 
approach of the United States. The EU also has its own in-
terests in mind – as it should have. As such, the European 
Commission has repeatedly stressed that it would not side 
with any country involved in the ongoing trade frictions. 
Thus, President Trump will likely remain frustrated with 
the EU and its China policy. 
In the end, as the United States and China are  amidst 
increasing trade tensions, the EU is on the sidelines and 
does not have much leverage to influence the direction of 
the talks of a possible bilateral trade deal. A bilateral deal 
could exclude the EU (with regard to market access and 
other concessions), leaving the EU as the actual loser of 
the triangle. 
7. Bad – Ugly – Really Ugly? Can the Conflict 
be Solved?
Trump’s China policies are rightly controversial. But will 
the president change his course? This is anything but 
certain. Not only Trump but also his key economic advi-
sors perceive China as an adversary. Congress supports 
a tough stance toward the country. While polls show 
that a majority of Americans objects to Trump’s tariff 
escalations, this has not led to a major change in voting 
behavior in the last midterm elections. The United States 
has experienced dynamic economic growth in 2018, and 
employment is strong. Many analysts expect a slowdown 
in 2019 with increasing risks towards the end of the year 
and 2020. Stock markets have already become skittish. 
The disapproval rating for the President had reached one 
of its highpoints in late-January 2019, with 57 percent of 
those polled disapproving, according to FiveThirtyEight 
(an initiative that focuses on opinion poll analysis), due 
to the recent government shutdown. Only 39.3 percent 
of those polled approved of the president. In late March, 
the approval ratings improved a bit, with 52.9 percent 
disapproving and 42.1 percent approving of the president. 
This could be a result of the completion of Robert Muel-
ler’s investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 
election. According to an initial summary, the so-called 
Mueller report did not find a collusion between the Trump 
campaign and Russia. The approval rating is anything but 
great – but not so much worse than President Obama’s rat-
ing at that time in his Presidency (46.6 percent approval 
rating).121
Trump might ease his stance on China – or he might 
not. The president is good at shaping narratives. He might 
try to blame the economic situation on US trading part-
ners to distract from domestic problems. Moreover, the re-
lationship with China is much more than just economics. 
China has become an economic and political superpower 
that threatens the United States and its role not just in the 
world economy. In addition, there are security concerns 
regarding China, which also involve the threat of cyberat-
tacks. The conflict is thus far from over. Which scenarios 
are possible?
Scenario 1: Best Case, but highly unlikely – the dispute 
will be solved and the multilateral trading system will be 
advanced
The United States and China manage to solve the current 
trade dispute and agree on an ambitious trade deal with a 
strong enforcement mechanism. 
Within this deal, China commits to deep structural 
reforms that address the basic concerns of the United 
States and agrees to a concrete timetable to implement 
them. Beijing pledges to provide more transparency in its 
dealings with state-owned enterprises, promises to more 
rigorously notify its subsidies at the WTO, and it announc-
es it will tackle overcapacities, such as in steel production. 
In addition, Beijing agrees to more market access for ag-
riculture and services, the abolition of non-tariff barriers, 
the end to currency manipulation, a strong protection for 
intellectual property rights, an end to forced technology 
transfers, and a strong deal on cyber security. 
Furthermore, China realizes how important the 
multilateral rules-based trading system is for the develop-
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ment of the country. In return, it is willing to accept some 
serious changes. First, China is open to negotiating new 
multilateral rules on subsidies and SOEs. Even though 
China is not willing to give up its developing country 
status, it is willing to have more flexible implementation 
rules on new agreements, including stricter deadlines and 
more concessions regarding market opening. The United 
States, consequently, gives up blocking the reform of the 
WTO dispute settlement procedure, which clears the way 
for further substantial WTO reform. 
A deal that ends the US-China trade conflict and leads 
to structural reforms in China would be good for the EU 
and Germany, as well. It is paramount for the EU and 
Germany, however, that the reforms are not applied dis-
criminatorily; in other words, that there is no preferential 
treatment of US companies. Furthermore, the reforms 
need to be lasting, legally binding, and enforceable.
Alas, such an ambitious agreement remains highly 
unlikely. The tariff escalation in May 2019 does not bode 
well for a deep and ambitious trade agreement.
Scenario 2: Pretty Bad, but better than nothing and still 
a possibility – a deal with a timeline will be agreed upon, 
but it comes with a lot of uncertainties
The United States and China agree on a bilateral deal and 
both declare victory. However, this does not entail sub-
stantial changes in the Chinese industrial strategy. The 
agreement includes, first and foremost, China’s promise 
to buy more US agricultural and energy goods. The six 
agreements, which were mentioned above (on agriculture, 
services, non-tariff barriers, intellectual property rights, 
forced technology transfers, and cyber security) are final-
ized, but come without deep reforms and without a strong 
enforcement mechanism. 
Many reform proposals for multilateral bodies fall 
by the wayside. China supports the EU with regard to 
Appellate Body reform but does not make many conces-
sions on subsidies notification or its developing country 
status. Overall, the underlying problems in the US-China 
relationship are not solved.
This scenario is quite likely. The Federal Reserve has 
revised the 2019 growth estimate for the United States 
down from 2.5 percent to 2.3 percent, also partly because 
of the US-China trade conflict. Trump might want to 
declare any Chinese concessions a victory as soon as pos-
sible to calm markets. China also cannot afford to indefi-
nitely prolong the trade conflict with the United States, 
because economic growth will fall under the magic 6.5-7 
percent growth that is needed to sustain economic devel-
opment and political stability. 
On the plus side, such a deal would be better than a 
full-fledged trade war for both the two conflicting parties 
and the world economy. On the downside, the deal would 
come with many uncertainties about the implementa-
tion on all levels (federal, state, and local), and about the 
validity and enforcement of the agreement. Furthermore, 
it is likely that such a deal would be rather discriminatory 
in nature, benefitting US companies more than European 
ones. Last but not least, the conflict could ignite again at 
any point in time. 
Scenario 3: Really Bad, less likely but a distinct possibility 
– escalation of tit-for-tat protectionism
With Trump’s tariff increase in May 2019 and China’s 
retaliation, the tit-for-tat tariff spiral has already wors-
ened – and in this scenario it would spiral further out of 
control. Unlike in the previous scenario, this does not lead 
to an agreement but to a no-deal situation. China does not 
implement further meaningful structural reforms. WTO 
reforms are out of the question; the Appellate Body of the 
WTO ceases to work at the end of the year. 
This worst-case scenario would be a disaster not only 
for the world economy but also for the United States. 
Stock markets would react strongly. Trade would de-
crease; a global recession could become a reality. A study 
released in February 2019 by the US-based “Tariffs Hurt 
the Heartland” initiative estimated that an increase of US 
tariffs to 25 percent, coupled with tariffs already in place 
and retaliation, would reduce US employment by over 
934,000 jobs and cost the average family of four 767 US 
dollars.122 Pressure from US farmers and other affected 
stakeholders is likely to increase. Trump, being sensitive 
to developments on the stock market, should want to 
avoid this scenario, in particular in the light of the up-
coming elections. On the other hand, he might not. Thus 
he might use the US-China trade conflict to divert the 
attention away from his own personal scandals as well as 
dampening economic growth outlooks as the elections 
are coming closer. 
8. Outlook and Recommendations: Go-It-
Alone Is Bound to Fail
Without a doubt, China does not always play by the rules. 
This needs to change. The country needs to improve mar-
ket access for foreign firms in both trade and investment. 
It needs to put an end to market-distorting industrial poli-
cies, fulfill its existing WTO commitments, and commit to 
new obligations. 
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Tit-for-tat protectionism and go-it-alone strategies 
are not the right way forward, however, as they do not 
address underlying problems. Decoupling from China 
will also not work. China is an important market and will 
remain so in the future. Additional tariffs will make the 
United States neither more competitive nor more secure. 
The Chinese market is critical to the global competitive-
ness of US companies, and US consumers benefit greatly 
from imports of lower-cost goods from China.
The trade conflict between the United States and China 
is a severe threat to the world economy. The IMF empha-
sized in its April 2019 World Economic Outlook that the 
risks for the global economy have increased. The WTO 
has already downgraded its outlook for 2018 trade growth 
to 3.9 percent (September 2018; down from an original 
estimate of 4.4 percent in April); growth is expected to 
further decrease to 3.7 percent in 2019.123 Particularly, 
“activity softened amid an increase in trade tensions 
and tariff hikes between the United States and China, a 
decline in business confidence, a tightening of financial 
conditions, and higher policy uncertainty across many 
economies,” according to the IMF.124 In addition, in 2018, 
China’s economic growth dropped to the lowest rate since 
1990. One reason is that the trade conflict with the United 
States has led to lower consumer spending and lower 
investment.125 
The Task Force on US-China Policy, a group of senior 
US-China specialists in the United States, recommended 
in its February 2019 report the initiation of a strategy of 
“smart competition,” which includes focusing on American 
strength to compete effectively, while at the same time 
building international coalitions to put pressure on Chi-
na.126 This is not only the right way forward for the United 
States, the recommendation also holds true for the EU. In 
fact, there is a lot the United States and the EU could do 
together. 
1. Building Economic Strength
The United States and the EU are rightly concerned about 
fair competition with China. However, both need to focus 
more on their own strengths to be able to compete suc-
cessfully. 
The loss of the manufacturing base in the United 
States has less to do with China’s unfair trading practices 
than with a servicification of the economy, policies that 
gave preference to financial markets, as well as deficits 
in education and infrastructure. Thus, the United States 
needs to invest more in its ailing infrastructure, as well 
as in education, to address the existing skills gap. More 
research and development (R&D), more research on new 
technologies, and more focus on science are also needed.
The same holds true for the EU. According to a report 
by the European Commission (May 2018), EU companies 
spend less on innovation than their competitors do. While 
the EU has only 26 “Unicorn Startups” (startups valued 
at over 1 billion US dollars), the United States has 109 and 
China 59. In addition, the Commission criticizes that the 
overall amount of venture capital and the average size 
of funds in Europe is too small to allow its startups to 
become big companies.127 The EU and its member states 
therefore need to improve their funding of research 
teams across Europe and to encourage private invest-
ments in R&D. Further investments in education and 
lifelong learning programs should complement these 
efforts. There is also a strong need to adapt European 
workers and SMEs to digitalization. According to the 
study, 40 percent of the workforce in Europe needs digital 
upskilling. At the same time, the completion of a com-
prehensive Common European Market – implementing 
the four fundamental freedoms (free movement of goods, 
capital, services, and labor) – is paramount to increase 
EU competitiveness. This is most notably the case in the 
services sector. 
When Angela Merkel visited Trump in 2017, one of the 
topics for discussion was the German dual vocational 
training, a skills-based education system. Partnering be-
tween European and US counterparts and looking for best 
practices in the field of education would be a good way to 
enhance competitiveness on both sides of the Atlantic.
The EU and the United States should also strengthen 
transatlantic cooperation on research and development. 
The basis for this is the Agreement for Scientific and 
Technological Cooperation. Originally signed in 1998, it 
was renewed five times, the latest in October 2018. In 2017, 
the two partners conducted the EU-US Joint Consultative 
Group Meeting on Science and Technology Cooperation. 
This forum offers a great opportunity to exchange views 
on some of the most pressing issues such as digitalization, 
as well as to identify areas of mutual interests. The United 
States and the EU should not only take a defensive ap-
proach towards China, they should strengthen their own 
efforts at home and intensify their R&D cooperation.
2. Strengthening Alliances – Rebuilding the Transatlantic 
Relationship
Both the EU and the United States are economic power-
houses, but they are bound to fail in their efforts toward 
China if they try to go it alone. However, the transatlantic 
relationship is strained. Cooperation requires trust and 
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understanding, and both need to be re-established in the 
transatlantic relationship. In a first step to revitalize the 
partnership, the United States should therefore phase out 
all tariffs implemented in the name of national security 
and abstain from erecting further barriers, including on 
trade in cars and car parts.  
The EU also has some homework to do. Foremost, it 
needs to work on a coherent and unified China policy. The 
strategic outlook presented in March 2019 and the EU-
China summit of April 2019 are a step in the right direc-
tion but much more needs to be done. In addition, the EU 
should try to channel shared US grievances with Chinese 
trade policies toward multilateral solutions whenever 
possible. The Trilateral Initiative is one way forward to 
engage the United States in a dialogue on meaningful 
China reforms. Within this forum, the EU and the United 
States could also work more closely together on advanc-
ing national policy instruments – such as competition 
law, investment screening, and government procure-
ment – to address unfair trade policies. In addition, the 
three partners could also work on 5G security and tech 
regulations. However, they need to be careful not to open 
back doors for protectionism that will end up hurting the 
Unites States, the EU, and their close partners. Another 
important institution is the Global Forum on Steel Excess 
Capacity. Even though it has not yet lived up to US expec-
tations, it is indispensable as there are few alternatives in 
which G20 countries can address steel overcapacities. 
The EU and the United States should also intensify 
their discussions on a trade agreement, taking national 
constraints into account but not losing sight of the main 
goals for such agreements. A free trade agreement is 
meant to increase trade and to reduce costs in trading 
– not to balance bilateral current accounts as the US ne-
gotiation goals outline – in order to increase welfare and 
jobs for both partners. It is also to open up markets – not 
to incentivize relocation of production to one of the part-
ners (in essence, rules of origin, RoO, should be liberal 
– unlike USMCA, which features very strict RoO). And it 
should not prevent the partners from concluding trade 
agreements with other countries (meaning it should not 
include a non-market economy clause such as USMCA). 
Ultimately, a trade agreement should set high standards 
also for new areas of trade. If a comprehensive agreement 
is not feasible right now, the two partners should take a 
step-by-step approach, first focusing on industrial goods 
tariffs and regulatory cooperation. Other issues should be 
left on the table for later stages of the negotiations. 
3. Setting High Standards in Trade Agreements
Bilateral and regional trade agreements are great op-
portunities to create strong economic partnerships and 
ambitious trade rules. Thus, the United States would 
be well-advised to reconsider joining the CPTPP, which 
established – among other things – standards on state-
owned enterprises and subsidies. CPTPP also provides a 
counterbalance to China’s influence in the region. Signing 
a trade agreement with Japan, as the United States plans 
to do, would also be a step in the right direction.
The EU also plays an important role in rebalancing 
Chinese influence. As such, EU member states should 
quickly implement the recently concluded economic 
partnership agreement with Japan, the EU’s second larg-
est trading partner in Asia after China. This would help 
to achieve more opportunities for European businesses 
and consumers, while promoting European values with 
an important economic partner. The same holds true for 
the trade agreement with Singapore, which the European 
Parliament recently ratified; it should be implemented 
as quickly as possible. The next logical step would be the 
ratification of the trade agreement with Vietnam, which, 
unfortunately, is currently blocked in the Parliament. The 
EU should also push for fast progress in the trade negotia-
tions with individual ASEAN countries, Australia, and 
New Zealand.
4. Reforming the WTO
Market-distorting practices – such as forced technology 
transfers, intellectual property rights violations, and 
state subsidies – need to be addressed within the WTO. 
The United States and the EU should keep up pressure 
on China. The country needs to abide by the rules of 
the WTO and fulfil the commitments it has made in its 
Accession Protocol. The United States and the EU should 
– where possible – join forces in WTO dispute settlement 
cases against China. 
But this will not be enough. The organization, which 
for three decades has ensured predictable and open trade 
relations, is in dire need of reform. The United States has 
rightly pointed out many deficiencies of the system. This 
includes insufficient WTO rules, the deadlock of the Doha 
Round, inadequate monitoring, and the role of develop-
ing countries. But the US means for how to achieve these 
reforms – foremost blocking the appointment of Appellate 
Body members – are wrong. 
The EU should thus continue in its efforts to work 
constructively not just with the Trump administration, 
but also to intensify its exchange with the US Congress. 
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The EU’s reform proposals could serve as a good basis for 
this. The most pressing issue is the reform of the dispute 
settlement procedure. However, the rules of the organiza-
tion also need to be updated. The EU should also use its 
bilateral dialogue with China (as mentioned during the 
EU China summit) to advance the reform discussions. As 
such, the EU can serve as moderator between the two 
conflicting parties, while at the same time pursing its own 
interests. 
The United States, on the other hand, would be well 
advised to work closer with the EU and other countries 
(including China) to modernize WTO rules. Openness 
to dialogue – instead of unilateral pressure – is the way 
forward. As such, progress in the WTO could be possible, 
without putting the entire trading system in danger. This 
would also help to restore US global economic leadership 
in trade. 
5. Work with China on Meaningful Trade and Investment 
Deals
For years, the United States and China had negotiated 
an investment treaty, covering both the protection of 
investments, as well as market access issues. This agree-
ment would have been binding under international law. 
President Trump put these negotiations on ice. Instead, 
the United States and China are currently negotiating 
a bilateral trade deal, which is more transactional than 
binding in nature. The United States needs to be care-
ful that the deal does not backfire by hurting the global 
trading order. Thus, the deal should focus on structural 
reforms in China. It should be transparent and encompass 
an enforcement mechanism that does not undermine the 
WTO. Last but not least, improved markets access should 
not be discriminatory. 
The EU is negotiating its own bilateral investment 
agreement with China. In this regard, the EU-China sum-
mit, which set the year 2020 as the deadline for the ne-
gotiations, was a success. But the EU also needs to make 
sure that China implements the promised structural re-
forms and improves market access, as well as investment 
protection. Among other things, China should remove 
joint venture requirements and ownership caps, elimi-
nate forced technology transfer, create and implement a 
limited negative list for the service sector (contrary to a 
positive list approach, a negative list approach requires 
market access and national treatment to be applied to all 
services while exceptions are listed), limit subsidies, and 
increase transparency in its policies on SOEs. 
The EU and the United States should update each other 
regularly on progress within their negotiations. 
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Annex A: Economic Data
Source: US Census Bureau, <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/sta-
tistics/country/index.html> (accessed January 8, 2019).
Annex A1: Greatest US Trade Deficits  
with China, by Product
2017, Billions of US Dollars
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Annex A3: US Greatest Trade Surpluses with China, by Product
2017, Billions of US Dollars
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Annex B: WTO Disputes
B1 WTO Disputes: United States vs. China
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000 US Exports to China
US Imports from China
X/
20
18
IX/
20
18
VII
I/2
01
8
VII
/2
01
8
VI/
20
18
V/
20
18
IV/
20
18
III/
20
18
II/2
01
8
I/2
01
8
XII
/2
01
7
XI/
20
17
X/
20
17
IX/
 20
17
VII
I/2
01
7
VII
/2
01
7
VI/
20
17
V/
20
17
IV/
20
17
III/
20
17
II/2
01
7
I/2
01
7
Source: USA Trade Online, <http://usatrade.census.gov/Perspective60> (ac-
cessed January 22, 2019).
Annex A4: US - Chinese Monthly Trade in Agricultural Products
2017-2018, in Millions of US Dollars
Year Case Number Description of Case Third Parties Decision
2004 DS309 Enterprises in China were entitled to a 
partial refund of the VAT on integrated 
circuits, resulting in a lower VAT rate on their 
products and subjecting imported ICs to 
higher taxes.
none Request was withdrawn. Mutu-
ally agreed upon solution.
2006 DS340 Three legal instruments enacted by China, 
which impose a 25 percent “charge” on 
imported auto parts “characterized as 
complete motor vehicles” based on speci-
fied criteria and prescribe administrative 
procedures associated with the imposition 
of that charge.
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Japan, 
Mexico, Taiwan, Thailand
United States claimed that the 
measures were inconsistent 
with WTO rules. The case was 
ruled in favor of the United 
States. China  hence introduced 
regulation to implement the DSB 
recommendations.
2007 DS358 The United States requested consultations 
with China concerning measures granting 
refunds, reductions, or exemptions from 
taxes and other payments owed to the 
government by enterprises in China.
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Egypt, European Union, 
Japan, Taiwan
Request was withdrawn. Mutu-
ally agreed upon solution by 
means of a memorandum of 
understanding.
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Year Case Number Description of Case Third Parties Decision
2007 DS362 The four matters on which the United States 
requested consultations were: 
the thresholds that must be met in order for 
certain acts of trademark counterfeiting and 
copyright piracy to be subject to criminal 
procedures and penalties;
goods that infringe on intellectual property 
rights that are confiscated by Chinese cus-
toms authorities, in particular, the disposal 
of such goods following removal of their 
infringing features;
the scope of coverage of criminal pro-
cedures and penalties for unauthorized 
reproduction or unauthorized distribution of 
copyrighted works; and   
the denial of copyright and related rights 
protection and enforcement to creative 
works of authorship, sound recordings and 
performances that have not been authorized 
for publication or distribution within China. 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
European Union, India, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey
The Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) ruled in favor of the United 
States that China’s practices 
do not correspond to the TRIPS 
agreement. 
2007 DS363 The United States requested consultations 
with China concerning:  
certain measures that restrict trading rights 
with respect to imported films for theatrical 
release, audiovisual home entertainment 
products (e.g., video cassettes and DVDs), 
sound recordings and publications (e.g., 
books, magazines, newspapers, and elec-
tronic publications); and
certain measures that restrict market ac-
cess for, or discriminate against, foreign 
suppliers of distribution services for publica-
tions and foreign suppliers of audiovisual 
services (including distribution services) for 
audiovisual home entertainment products.
Australia, European Union, Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan
The DSB ruled in favor of the 
United States that these Chinese 
measures were inconsistent with 
China’s Accession Protocol, the 
GATS, and the GATT 1994.
2008 DS373 The United States requested consulta-
tions regarding a number of Chinese 
measures affecting financial information 
services and foreign financial services sup-
pliers in China. Such measures included no 
fewer than a dozen legal and administrative 
instruments that require foreign financial in-
formation suppliers to supply their services 
through an entity designated by Xinhua 
News Agency (“Xinhua”).
none Request was withdrawn. Mutu-
ally agreed upon solution by 
means of a memorandum of 
understanding.
2009 DS387 The United States requested consultations 
with China with regards to certain measures 
offering grants, loans, and other incentives 
to enterprises in China.
none Consultations are ongoing.
2010 DS394 The United States requested consultations 
with China with respect to China’s restraints 
on the export from China of various forms of 
raw materials (bauxite, coke, fluorspar, mag-
nesium, manganese, silicon carbide, silicon 
metal, yellow phosphorus, and zinc). 
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, European Union, 
India, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, 
Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Turkey
The DSB ruled in favor of the 
United States that China’s export 
restraints were not justified.
2010 DS413 The United States alleged that China per-
mits only a Chinese entity (China UnionPay) 
to supply electronic payment services for 
payment card transactions denominated 
and paid in renminbi in China. 
Australia, Ecuador, European Union, 
Guatemala, India, Japan, Korea
The DSB rejected the claims put 
forward by the United States on 
the basis of a lack of evidence.
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2010 DS414 The United States requested consultations 
with China with respect to measures impos-
ing countervailing duties and anti-dumping 
duties on grain oriented flat-rolled electrical 
steel (“GOES”) from the United States as set 
forth by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. 
China had deemed benefits under the “Buy 
America” provisions of the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and State 
government procurement laws as subsidies. 
Argentina, European Union, Honduras, 
India, Japan, Korea, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Vietnam
The DSB ruled in favor of the 
United States that China acted 
inconsistent with its obligations 
under the Anti-Dumping and 
SCM Agreements.
2010 DS419 The United States requested consultations 
with China concerning certain measures 
providing grants, funds, or awards to enter-
prises manufacturing wind power equipment 
in China.
none In consultations between the 
United States, China, and the 
European Union.
2011 DS427 The United States requested consultations 
with China concerning China’s measures 
imposing anti-dumping and countervail-
ing duties on broiler products from the 
United States.
Chile, European Union, Japan, Mexico, 
Norway, Saudi Arabia, Thailand
The DSB ruled in favor of the 
United States that China acted 
inconsistent with its obligations 
under the Anti-Dumping and 
SCM Agreements.
2012 DS431 The United States requested consultations 
with China with respect to China’s restric-
tions on the export of various forms of rare 
earths, tungsten, and molybdenum.
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Colombia, European Union, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Norway, 
Oman, Peru, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Taiwan, Turkey, Vietnam
The DSB ruled in favor of the 
United States that China’s export 
restrictions were not justified.
2012 DS440 The United States requested consulta-
tions with China with regard to imposing 
anti-dumping and countervailing duties on 
certain automobiles from the United States.
Colombia, European Union, India, 
Japan, Korea, Oman, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey
The DSB ruled that certain as-
pects of the duties imposed are 
consistent with WTO rules, while 
some are not.
2012 DS450 The United States requested consultations 
with China concerning certain measures 
providing subsidies in the form of grants, 
loans, forgone government revenue, the 
provision of goods and services, and other 
incentives contingent upon export perfor-
mance to automobile and automobile-parts 
enterprises in China.
none In consultations between the 
United States, China, and the 
European Union.
2015 DS489 The United States requested consultations 
with China with regard to certain measures 
providing subsidies contingent upon export 
performance to enterprises in several indus-
tries in China.
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, European Union, 
India, Japan, Korea, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, Taiwan
China and the United States 
reached a mutual agreement 
by means of a memorandum of 
understanding.
2015 DS501 The United States requested consulta-
tions with China regarding tax measures in 
relation to the sale of certain domestically 
produced aircraft in China.
none In consultations between the 
United States, Canada, the Euro-
pean Union, and China.
2016 DS508 The United States requested consultations 
with China regarding China’s export duties 
on various forms of antimony, cobalt, cop-
per, graphite, lead, magnesia, talc, tantalum, 
and tin.
Brazil, Canada, Chile, European Union, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, 
Korea, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Sin-
gapore, Taiwan, Vietnam
As of November 2016, a panel 
has been established.
2016 DS511 The United States requested consultations 
with China regarding certain measures 
through which China appears to provide 
domestic support in favor of agricultural 
producers, in particular those producing 
wheat, India rice, Japonica rice, and corn.
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, European 
Union, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, 
Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Nor-
way, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Vietnam
Consultations are ongoing.
2016 DS517 The United States requested consultations 
with China concerning China’s administra-
tion of its tariff rate quotas, including those 
for wheat, short- and medium- grain rice, 
long-grain rice, and corn.
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Ecuador, 
European Union, Guatemala, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, 
Norway, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, 
Ukraine, Vietnam
The panel is expected to issue its 
final report in the second quarter 
of 2019.
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2002 DS252 The European Communities (and China) re-
quested consultations with the United States 
regarding the definitive safeguard measures 
imposed by the United States in the form of 
an increase in duties on imports of certain flat 
steel, hot-rolled bar, cold-finished bar, rebar, 
certain welded tubular products, carbon and 
alloy fittings, stainless steel bar, stainless 
steel rod, tin mill products, and stainless steel 
wire and in the form of a tariff rate quota on 
imports of slabs.
Brazil, Canada, Cuba, European Union, 
Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Norway, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Turkey, Venezuela
The Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) ruled in favor of China that 
the US practice was inconsis-
tent with WTO rules.
2007 DS368 China requested consultations with the United 
States on the preliminary anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty determinations made by 
the US Department of Commerce with re-
spect to coated free sheet paper from China.
none Consultations are ongoing.
2008 DS379 China requested consultations concerning 
the definitive anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties imposed by the United States pursuant 
to the final anti-dumping and countervailing 
duty determinations and orders issued by 
the US Department of Commerce in several 
investigations.
Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Brazil, 
Canada, European Union, India, Japan, 
Kuwait, Mexico, Norway, Saudi Arabia, 
Taiwan, Turkey
The DSB ruled that, in certain 
regards, the United States acted 
both consistently and inconsis-
tently with the WTO rules.
2009 DS392 China requested consultations with the United 
States concerning certain measures taken 
by the United States affecting the import of 
poultry products from China. 
Brazil, European Union, Guatemala, 
Korea, Taiwan, Turkey
The DSB ruled in favor of the 
United States that it had acted 
consistently with WTO rules.
2009 DS399 China requested consultations with the United 
States concerning increased tariffs on certain 
passenger vehicle and light truck tires from 
China.
European Union, Japan, Taiwan, Tur-
key, Vietnam
The DSB ruled in favor of the 
United States that it had acted 
consistently with the WTO rules.
2011 DS422 China requested consultations with the United 
States regarding the latter’s anti-dumping 
measures on certain frozen warmwater shrimp 
from China.  
European Union, Honduras, Japan, 
Korea, Thailand, Vietnam
The DSB ruled that, in certain 
regards, the United States acted 
both consistently and inconsis-
tently with the WTO rules.
2012 DS437 China requested consultations with the United 
States concerning the imposition of counter-
vailing duty measures by the United States on 
certain products from China.
Australia, Brazil, Canada, European 
Union, India, Japan, Korea, Norway, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Vietnam
The Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) ruled in favor of China that 
the US practice was inconsis-
tent with the WTO rules.
2012 DS449 China requested consultations with the United 
States concerning the following measures: 
a new piece of legislation (Public Law 112-
99) that explicitly allows for the application 
of countervailing measures to non-market 
economy countries; 
countervailing duty determinations or actions 
made or performed by US authorities between 
November 20, 2006, and March 13, 2012, 
with respect to Chinese products; 
anti-dumping measures associated with the 
concerned countervailing duty measures, 
as well as the combined effect of these anti-
dumping measures and the parallel counter-
vailing duty measures;
and the United States’ failure to provide the 
US Department of Commerce (USDOC) with 
the legal authority to identify and avoid the 
double remedies with respect to investiga-
tions or reviews initiated on or between 
November 20, 2006, and March 13, 2012.
Australia, Canada, European Union, 
India, Japan, Russia, Turkey, Vietnam
The Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) ruled in favor of China that 
the US practice was inconsis-
tent with the WTO rules.
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2013 DS471 China requested consultations with the United 
States regarding the use of certain methodol-
ogies in anti-dumping investigations involving 
Chinese products.
Brazil, Canada, European Union, 
India, Japan, Korea, Norway, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Vietnam
The DSB ruled in favor of the 
United States that it has acted 
consistently with WTO rules, 
and the matter was referred 
to arbitration as of September 
2018.
2016 DS515 China requested consultations with the United 
States concerning certain provisions of US 
law pertaining to the determination of normal 
value for “non-market economy” countries in 
anti-dumping proceedings involving products 
from China.
none Consultations are ongoing.
2018 DS543 China requested consultations with the United 
States concerning certain tariff measures on 
Chinese goods, which would allegedly be 
implemented through Section 301-310 of the 
US Trade Act of 1974.
Brazil, Canada, European Union, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, 
New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Singa-
pore, Taiwan, Ukraine
Consultations are ongoing, and 
a panel has been established as 
of January 2019.
2018 DS544 China requested consultations with the United 
States concerning certain duties that the 
United States has imposed on imports of steel 
and aluminum products.
Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, 
Egypt, European Union, Guatemala, 
Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, 
Ukraine, Venezuela
Consultations are ongoing, and 
a panel has been established as 
of January 2019.
2018 DS562 China requested consultations with the United 
States concerning the definitive safeguard 
measure imposed by the United States on im-
ports of certain crystalline silicon photovoltaic 
products.
none Consultations are ongoing.
2018 DS563 China requested consultations with the United 
States concerning certain measures allegedly 
adopted and maintained by the governments 
of certain US states and municipalities in rela-
tion to alleged subsidies or alleged domestic 
content requirements in the energy sector.
None Consultations are ongoing.
2018 DS565 China requested consultations with the United 
States concerning certain tariff measures 
allegedly imposed by the United States on 
certain goods from China.
None Consultations are ongoing.
Source: WTO, <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm> (accessed February 26, 2019)
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Leadership Senate
R-KY Mitch McConnell Senate Majority 
Leader
In the middle; 
signaled a quick end 
to any legislation to 
increase congres-
sional authority over 
presidential tariff 
increases128 but 
spoke out against the 
spiraling of the steel 
and aluminum tariffs 
into a trade war.129
Initially supported, 
now urges end to the 
tariff war, citing detri-
mental effects on US 
economy130; calls 
tariffs “the wrong 
path for us” but cites 
no violation of trade 
policy.131
Position unknown. In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.132
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.133
R-SD John Thune Senate Majority Whip Generally against; 
speaking in favor 
of “engaging in the 
global marketplace” 
and against with-
drawing from TPP.134
Against; voiced 
concerns in a joint 
letter about the 
detrimental effects of 
agricultural tariffs on 
farmers in red states 
like South Dakota135 
and noted that “there 
are no winners in a 
trade war, par-
ticularly farmers and 
ranchers.”136
Mixed; wrote an arti-
cle about strengthen-
ing ties to the Euro-
pean Union in order 
to isolate Russia in 
the global commu-
nity137 but warned 
that Congress would 
not approve TTIP 
unless American 
farmers would be 
given “more certainty 
with regard to the 
approval process 
for biotechnology 
products.”138
In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.139
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.140
D-NY Charles  Schumer Senate Minority 
Leader
Generally in favor; 
considers that Trump 
has identified China 
as an opponent. 
However, considers 
steel and alumi-
num tariffs to be 
“haphazard.”141
In favor; supports 
aggressive ap-
proach toward China 
regarding govern-
ment subsidies, 
inadequate access 
for US companies, 
dumping, technology 
transfer, and theft 
of US intellectual 
property.
Clashed with Euro-
pean Union over in-
clusion of agriculture 
in TTIP.142
In 2015, voted no 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.143
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.144
D-IL Richard Durbin Senate Minority Whip Against; concerned 
about the effects of 
steel and aluminum 
tariffs and subse-
quent retaliation on 
US jobs, particularly 
Illinois producers of 
pork and soy-
beans.145 146
Against; considers 
tariffs to be a gate-
way to an “all-out 
trade war” that will 
alienate US allies, 
whose support the 
United States needs 
in order to address 
steel dumping.147
Position unknown. In 2015, voted no 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.148
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.149
Annex C: Overview: Prominent Members of US Congress and Their Views on Trump’s Trade Policy
State of Play as of April 2019
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Trade
Leadership House
D-CA Nancy Pelosi Speaker of the 
House
Generally in favor of 
steel and aluminum 
tariffs based on their 
confrontation of 
China’s practices.150 
However, critical 
of USMCA being 
passed without major 
changes to protec-
tions with regards 
to labor and the 
environment.151
In favor (first round) 
as a “leverage point” 
to negotiate better 
trade of US products 
in China; supports 
“strong, smart and 
strategic action 
against China’s 
brazenly unfair trade 
policies.”
Position not clear. In 2015, voted no 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.152
D-MD Steny Hoyer Majority Leader Generally against; 
released a statement 
in March 2019 that 
the massive goods 
trade deficit indicates 
that “the President 
has flunked the test 
he set for himself,” 
and he should “ac-
knowledge that his 
scattershot approach 
to trade policy is 
failing.”153
Not explicitly in 
favor of or against 
the new USMCA 
agreement.154
Mixed; notes that 
tariffs could be an 
“effective way to end 
the trade dispute” 
but cautions against 
“one-size-fits-all” 
approaches, saying 
that “we need to deal 
with China as China, 
not as part of dealing 
with Canada, dealing 
with Mexico, dealing 
with Europe.”155
Position not clear, 
but likely in favor as a 
pro-trade Democrat.
In 2015, voted no 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.156
D-SC James Clyburn Majority Whip Generally against; 
noted that he was 
“concerned about 
the impact of all of 
Trump’s economic 
policies on South 
Carolina jobs and 
our future eco-
nomic growth and 
opportunities.”157 
Concrete position 
unknown, but given 
opposition to other 
Trump policies, likely 
against.
Position not clear, 
as he chose not to 
vote in favor of trade 
policy authority 
(which would have 
helped TTIP) and not 
strongly in favor of 
NAFTA.158
Did not vote on Bill 
H.R. 2146, which 
re-authorized the 
Trade Promotion 
Authority.159
R-CA Kevin McCarthy House Minority 
Leader
Supports tariffs on 
steel and aluminum, 
saying that “it’s 
correct to have this 
challenge”160 and 
denying that these 
tariffs would put the 
United States into a 
trade war.161
In favor; based on 
“standing up” for free 
trade.162
Likely in favor; 
pushed for a vote 
on the fast-track 
authority after it 
was defeated in 
the House in 2015, 
to assist Obama in 
passing TTIP.163
In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.164
R-LA Steve Scalise Minority Whip In favor of renegotia-
tion of USMCA as “a 
new trade deal that is 
better for Ameri-
can workers and 
consumers.”165
In favor; sees the 
tariffs as “the 
president standing 
up for our country” 
and “saying we’re 
not going to take this 
anymore.”166
Likely in favor, 
spoke in favor of 
TPA to “pass critical 
American trade 
legislation.”167
In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.168
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House of Representatives: 
Committees and Subcommittees *Selection of House Committees, Subcommittees, and Members. For the full list of relevant congressional com-
mittees on trade policy, consult the website of the Office of the United States Trade Representative <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/
congressional-affairs/congressional-committees> 
D-MA Richard Neal Chair of the House 
Ways and Means 
Committee
Generally against; 
wary of renegotiated 
NAFTA/USMCA169 
and warns 
against Trump’s 
“impulsiveness.”170
Against; notes that 
policy toward China 
must be “in the best 
interests” of the Unit-
ed States “today and 
for the future”; calls 
tariffs “easy, one-off 
transactions” in place 
of “real and lasting 
change”171 and 
“tools in search of a 
plan” with inadequate 
explanation.172
In favor; co-chair of 
the TTIP Caucus in 
2016.173
In 2015, voted no 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.174
R-TX Kevin Brady Ranking Member 
and former Chair of 
the House Ways and 
Means Committee
Against tariffs on 
steel and aluminum, 
calling them “taxes 
[that] impede eco-
nomic growth”;175 
signatory on letter 
to Trump urging him 
to reconsider these 
tariffs.176
Wary; notes that 
tariffs should only 
be imposed in ways 
that do not punish 
Americans.177
In favor; published 
a letter in 2016 to 
then-USTR Michael 
Froman, urging the 
administration to 
continue to pursue 
an ambitious TTIP.178
Skeptical concern-
ing a negotiation 
in stages with the 
EU, as expressed 
in the negotiating 
objectives of the 
USTR from January 
2019.179
In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.180
D-OR Earl Blumenauer Chair of the Trade 
Subcommittee of 
the House Ways and 
Means Committee
Against additional 
tariffs, as they in-
crease costs for US 
manufacturers and 
consumers: “it’s… a 
cost of doing busi-
ness, it affects what 
happens with Ameri-
can manufacturers, 
and in retail, and they 
are ultimately paid by 
the consumer.”181
Against additional 
tariffs in general, 
but voted yes on Bill 
H.R. 639, allowing 
for countervailing or 
anti-dumping duties 
against countries 
with undervalued 
currency.182
Not clear. Argued 
for a TPP agree-
ment with significant 
human rights, envi-
ronmental, and labor 
standards.183
In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.184
R-FL Vern Buchanan Ranking Member of 
the Trade Subcom-
mittee of the House 
Ways and Means 
Committee
Skeptical of addi-
tional tariffs. Signed 
a letter to President 
Trump, together with 
106 other Republican 
members of Con-
gress, urging Trump 
to consider that 
broad tariffs have a 
negative impact on 
the US economy, 
competitiveness and 
workers.185
As in the letter of 
the 107 Republi-
can members of 
Congress, Buchanan 
supports the resolve 
to address China’s 
unfair practices but 
urges, at the same 
time, that the admin-
istration reconsider 
the idea of broad 
tariffs.
Position unknown. In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.186
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D-MN Collin Peterson Chair of the Agricul-
ture Committee
Against additional 
tariffs, as they have 
hurt farm exports 
and will not improve 
conditions for US 
farmers.187
Against additional 
tariffs. Has warned 
that additional aid for 
farmers and ranch-
ers impacted by the 
tariffs will also be 
needed in 2019 or 
2020.188
Position on a free 
trade agreement with 
the EU is unknown. 
After the USTR 
scheduled a public 
hearing in 2016 on 
the dispute with the 
EU on the safety of 
US beef products, 
Collin Peterson de-
clared, “There is no 
doubt that American 
beef products are 
safe. The 20-year 
EU ban has been in 
effect far too long. 
It is not based on 
fact and should be 
lifted.”189
In 2015, voted no 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.190
R-TX Michael Conaway Ranking Member 
of the Agriculture 
Committee
In favor; says that 
Trump “defends 
America’s trade poli-
cies, which means…
going after folks who 
are violating.”191
In favor of both 
tariffs and the 
corresponding aid 
package to help 
farmers hurt by the 
measures, saying, 
“our president stood 
up to a bully and 
now he is standing 
up for rural America 
so it’s a good move 
forward.”192
In favor of TTIP, not-
ing that US farmers 
and ranchers would 
benefit tremendously 
from the expansion 
of US markets to 
Europe.193
In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.194
Senate: Committees and Subcommittees 
* Selection of Senate Committees, Subcommittees, and Members. For the full list of relevant congressional committees on trade policy, con-
sult the website of the Office of the United States Trade Representative <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/congressional-affairs/
congressional-committees>
R-IA Charles Grassley President Pro 
Tempore of the 
Senate and Chair of 
the Senate Finance 
Committee
In the middle; sup-
ports WTO and a 
rules-based trading 
system, which 
Trump continues to 
threaten; is against 
steel and aluminum 
tariffs on the basis 
that they will threaten 
US farmers; sup-
ports legislation to 
increase congres-
sional authority over 
presidential tariff in-
creases.195 However, 
he supports Section 
301 tariffs on China 
and the renegotiation 
of NAFTA.196
Against, on the 
grounds that this has 
“very detrimental” 
effects on US agri-
culture, particularly 
exports of soybeans 
and corn in Iowa.197 
198
Likely critical; 
clashed with then-
Commission Presi-
dent Barroso in 2014, 
noting that EC’s lack 
of completion for the 
regulatory process 
for biotechnology 
products pending 
“don’t produce much 
confidence for the 
future” of TTIP.199
Has expressed 
doubts whether an 
FTA with the Euro-
pean Union without 
agriculture products 
would pass through 
the United States 
Senate.200
In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.201
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.202
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D-OR Ron Wyden Ranking Member of 
the Senate Finance 
Committee
Critical, noting that 
“the only thing that is 
consistent about the 
Trump trade policy is 
the chaos”; wary of 
retaliation on Oregon 
farmers203 and 
critical of Trump’s 
utilization of national 
security as a basis 
for steel and alumi-
num tariffs.204
Generally in favor; 
supports an aggres-
sive approach toward 
China related to gov-
ernment subsidies, 
inadequate access 
for US companies, 
dumping, technology 
transfer, and theft 
of US intellectual 
property.
Skeptical; criticized 
a lack of transpar-
ency in TTIP nego-
tiations205 and had 
many reservations 
as to the conclusion 
of TTIP with regards 
to digital trade, 
labor and environ-
mental protections, 
and fair access 
for US agricultural 
producers.206
In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.207
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.208
R-TX John Cornyn Chair of the In-
ternational Trade, 
Customs, and Global 
Competitiveness 
Subcommittee of 
the Senate Finance 
Committee
Generally in favor; 
supported Trump’s 
imposition of steel 
and aluminum tariffs 
on allies (Canada, 
Mexico, EU), saying 
that the president’s 
“unconventional 
style…seems to be 
working for him.”209
Likely against; has 
warned that the tariff 
war could “escalate 
out of control”210 
and noted skepticism 
over the “uncertainty 
associated” with 
it.211
Opinion not directly 
known, but likely 
in favor; met with 
Commission Vice 
President Jyrki 
Katainen212 and 
Commissioner for 
Trade Cecelia Malm-
ström213 in 2017 to 
discuss EU-US trade 
relations; spoke out 
in favor of American 
FTAs with Chile and 
Singapore.214
In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.215
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.216
D-PA Robert Casey Ranking Member 
of the International 
Trade, Customs, and 
Global Competitive-
ness Subcommit-
tee of the Senate 
Finance Committee
In favor of Section 
232 tariffs, uncom-
mon for the Demo-
crats but in line with 
his red state con-
stituency, noting that 
he was “happy to see 
action being taken” 
and wished to relieve 
steelmakers in Penn-
sylvania through the 
measures;217 com-
mended the Trump 
administration for 
taking action on steel 
overcapacity.218
In favor; supports 
addressing “trade 
cheaters” to protect 
jobs in Pennsylva-
nia219 and asserted 
that he was “happy” 
with the tariff war 
with China.220
Skeptical of TTIP; 
called on Obama 
administration to 
protect American 
meat producers 
from EU efforts to 
prohibit them from 
using common 
product names with 
geographical indica-
tors; saying EU “used 
FTAs to persuade 
trading partners to 
impose barriers on 
US exports under the 
guise of protect-
ing geographical 
indications.”221
In 2015, voted no 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.222
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.223
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R-PA Patrick Toomey Member of the 
International Trade, 
Customs, and Global 
Competitiveness 
Subcommittee of 
the Senate Finance 
Committee
Critical of Section 
232 tariffs, calling 
them a “huge mis-
take”;224 introduced 
bipartisan legislation 
with Bob Corker 
proposing to limit 
presidential authority 
to impose tariffs on 
the grounds of na-
tional security. This 
legislation would also 
apply, if adopted, 
retroactively to any 
tariffs imposed in 
the past four years, 
giving Congress a 
say over Trump’s 
steel and aluminum 
tariffs.225 226
Generally against; 
requested the 
exemption of sev-
eral Pennsylvania 
manufacturers from 
the first round of 
tariffs from China, 
citing negative ef-
fects for American 
manufacturing.227
Skeptical of TTIP; 
spearheaded, with 
Senator Schumer, 
an effort to protect 
American dairy 
producers from EU 
efforts to prohibit 
them from using cer-
tain common cheese 
names within TTIP 
negotiations; noted 
that the EU used 
“free trade agree-
ments to persuade 
its trading partners 
to impose barriers to 
US exports under the 
guise of protection 
for its geographical 
indications.” 228
In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.229
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.230
R-OH Rob Portman Member of the 
International Trade, 
Customs, and Global 
Competitiveness 
Subcommittee of 
the Senate Finance 
Committee; 
was the United 
States Trade Repre-
sentative from May 
17, 2005, until May 
29, 2006
Critical of Sec-
tion 232 tariffs; 
introduced bipartisan 
legislation proposing 
to amend the Trade 
Expansion Act of 
1962 to ensure that 
assessments of a 
“national security” 
basis for trade ac-
tions is made by 
the Secretary of 
Defense, rather than 
the Secretary of 
Commerce, under 
current law. It limits 
the Secretary of 
Commerce’s involve-
ment to consultancy. 
This bill would also 
expand the use of 
the existing disap-
proval resolution 
process regarding 
trade restrictions on 
petroleum to all types 
of products.231
Supports the new 
USMCA agreement 
and more stringent 
rules of origin for 
automobiles.232
In favor of tariffs and 
a hard line policy 
against China; noted 
in a speech that 
“assertiveness with 
China is needed” 
considering that they 
have been “violating 
and circumventing 
our trade laws for 
decades,” although 
he’s also in sup-
port of “structural 
changes to the Chi-
nese economy” and 
concerned about the 
“collateral damage” 
caused to American 
producers as result 
of the tariffs.233
In favor of an ambi-
tious agreement, 
urging the US and EU 
not to “take things 
off the table” during 
TTIP negotiations,234 
but he also sent a 
bipartisan letter to 
USTR Michael Fro-
man in 2014 speak-
ing out against the 
EU restriction on the 
ability of American 
meat producers to 
use certain names 
with geographic 
indicators.235
In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.236
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.237
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R-WY Michael Enzi Chairman of the 
Senate Budget 
Committee
Generally skeptical; 
spoke out against 
Trump administra-
tion anti-dumping 
tariffs on news-
print paper, citing 
detrimental effects 
to rural newspa-
pers238 and against 
the Trump admin-
istration claim that 
the trade deficit is 
inherently bad. Also, 
he included sunset 
provisions in NAFTA 
renegotiation.239
Concrete position 
unknown; given 
skepticism on other 
Trump trade policies, 
likely critical.
Unclear if in favor or 
not, but signatory on 
a letter to USTR Mi-
chael Froman noting 
that TTIP needed a 
strong framework for 
agriculture and warn-
ing against European 
geographic indicator 
restrictions.240
In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.241
In July 2018, voted 
no on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.242
I-VT Bernie Sanders Ranking Member of 
the Senate Budget 
Committee
Wary of steel and 
aluminum tariffs; as-
serted that measures 
should be taken 
specifically against 
China.243
Supports penalties 
being imposed on 
China in order to 
avoid dumping and 
government subsidi-
zation; his position is 
that the trade deficit 
with China has led 
to substantial loss 
of US manufacturing 
jobs.
Not clear; was very 
critical regarding 
TPP.
In 2015, voted no 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.244
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.245
R-FL Marco Rubio Chair of the Senate 
Small Business 
Committee
Critical, asserting 
that “the right trade 
policy for the United 
States is not a choice 
of unrestrained free 
trade or protection-
ism”;246 against 
steel and aluminum 
tariffs in favor of 
policies that increase 
research and devel-
opment and skills 
training.247
Critical, noting that 
the United States 
needs “more than 
tariffs” to address 
Chinese unfair trade 
practices248 and 
that consumers will 
be harmed by mea-
sures more so than 
China.249
In favor; spoke out in 
support of TTIP with 
“enormous economic 
promise.”250
Did not vote in 2015 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.251
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.252
D-MD Ben Cardin Ranking Member 
of the Senate Small 
Business Committee
Against, noting that 
most Republicans 
disagree with the 
Trump trade policy 
and that his “han-
dling of the steel and 
aluminum tariffs” was 
“the wrong way to 
go.”253
Against, having 
called the tariffs a 
“failure”254 and not-
ing that he could not 
find representatives 
of any other country 
who agreed with this 
course of action.255
Skeptical of TTIP; 
led a bipartisan 
effort against Eu-
ropean attempts to 
restrict geographic 
indicators in dairy 
products256 and 
championed an 
amendment to make 
the rejection of the 
Boycott, Divestment, 
and Sanctions move-
ment against Israel a 
main trade negotiat-
ing objective in TTIP 
negotiations.257
In 2015, voted no 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.258
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.259
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R-SC Lindsey Graham Chair of Senate Judi-
ciary Committee
Generally supports 
Trump but wary of 
his chosen instru-
ments, noting that 
the best method to 
address Chinese 
unfair trade practices 
is through deals with 
US allies in EU.260
In favor, although 
he did admit that 
they could harm 
consumers.261
In favor; spoke about 
the benefits of a free 
trade agreement for 
automobile produc-
tion in South Carolina 
in the future.262
In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.263
In July 2018, voted 
no on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.264
D-CA Dianne Feinstein Ranking Member 
of Senate Judiciary 
Committee
Against; supported 
a bipartisan Senate 
resolution against 
steel and aluminum 
tariffs.265
Against, on the 
grounds that the 
only results have 
been “fewer markets 
and higher costs for 
farmers and ranch-
ers” with Californian 
agriculture workers 
as “pawns” in a trade 
war.266
Likely in favor, con-
sidering the positive 
statements she made 
on the TPA and TPP.
In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.267
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.268
R-AL Richard Shelby Chair of the Senate 
Appropriations 
Committee
Against; supported 
a bipartisan Senate 
resolution against 
steel and aluminum 
tariffs269 and as-
serted that “rather 
than imposing more 
tariffs, we should go 
back to the drawing 
board to renegotiate 
our trade agreements 
to make them fair 
and equitable to the 
American worker.”270
Against, noting that 
“what we should do 
is promote trade in 
the world, not try to 
stifle it.”271
Position unknown. In 2015, voted no 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.272
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.273
D-VT Patrick Leahy Ranking Member of 
the Senate Appro-
priations Committee
Vehemently against 
steel and aluminum 
tariffs, noting that 
“retaliatory tariffs will 
erode demand for 
American exports” 
and “these actions 
are not a path to fair 
trade, they are a path 
to failed trade.”274
Likely opposed, 
given opposition to 
steel tariffs.
Position unknown. In 2015, voted no 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.275
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.276
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R-MS Roger Wicker Chair of the Senate 
Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and 
Transportation
Favorable, espe-
cially concerning 
an aggressive trade 
approach to China. 
Nonetheless, in 
2015, Wicker called 
for trade agreements 
with countries in 
Asia, the Pacific, and 
Europe.277
Favorable; supports 
Trump’s aggressive 
policy approach 
against China: “China 
has a long history of 
unfair trade practices 
[…] President Trump 
is a tough negotia-
tor who is not afraid 
of seeking the 
best deals for our 
country.”278
Likely in favor, 
considering positive 
he statements made 
on an FTA with the 
EU in 2015. Wants 
to include provisions 
for GDPR/ EU Cyber 
Security Act in FTA 
negotiations with the 
EU.279
In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.280
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.281
D-WA Maria Cantwell Ranking Member 
of the Senate Com-
mittee on Com-
merce, Science, and 
Transportation
Opposed to Trump 
administration tariffs 
and their negative ef-
fect on Washington’s 
agriculture, seafood, 
and maritime indus-
tries, noting that 
“trade wars are not 
good. They’re very 
damaging.”282
Against, noting that 
she “wants a more 
sophisticated ap-
proach” to address-
ing the trade dispute 
with China.283 She 
also bemoaned 
job losses for solar 
power companies in 
Washington.284
Wrote a bipartisan 
letter to USTR Mi-
chael Froman, calling 
for negotiations to 
expand market ac-
cess for American 
apple and pear ex-
ports to Europe due 
to different varying 
standards.285
In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.286 
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.287 
R-AK Dan Sullivan Chair of the Security 
Subcommittee of 
the Senate Com-
mittee on Com-
merce, Science, and 
Transportation
Against additional 
tariffs, especially 
concerning seafood/
Alaskan salmon (one 
of Alaska’s biggest 
export sectors). 
Against an additional 
301 tariffs on Chi-
nese products, since 
frozen fish produced 
in the United States 
is filleted in China, 
therefore threatening 
US jobs in the fishing 
sector.288
Position unknown. In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.289
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.290
D-MA Edward Markey Ranking Member 
of the Security 
Subcommittee of 
the Senate Com-
mittee on Com-
merce, Science, and 
Transportation
Harshly criticized the 
administration’s deci-
sion to impose tariffs 
on imported solar 
panels and cells, 
“raising costs and 
attacking the growth 
of blue-collar jobs…
the Trump tariff will 
hurt workers, hurt 
homeowners who 
want to save on their 
electricity bills, and 
hurt a future with 
cleaner air, cleaner 
water, and fewer 
impacts from climate 
change.”291
Likely critical, given 
opposition to other 
Trump policies.
During TTIP negotia-
tions, wrote to USTR 
Michael Froman 
asking him to better 
protect American oil 
and gas exports, as 
“an agreement that 
requires automatic 
and unrestricted ap-
proval of US oil and 
gas exports to the 
EU has the potential 
to harm American 
consumers, our 
national security, and 
our environment.”292
In 2015, voted no 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.293
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.294
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R-KS Pat Roberts Chair of the Senate 
Agriculture, Nutri-
tion, and Forestry 
Committee
Critical; argues that 
Trump’s tariff strat-
egy is damaging to 
farmers.
Critical, as agricul-
ture is particularly 
suffering from retalia-
tory measures.295
Position unknown. In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.296
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.297
D-MI Debbie Stabenow Ranking Member of 
the Senate Agricul-
ture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry Committee
In favor of proposed 
automobile tariffs 
based on avoiding 
outsourcing, saying, 
“we want to export 
our products, not our 
jobs.”298
Agrees that the ad-
ministration needs to 
concentrate on Chi-
nese dumping, but 
that it “needs a more 
thoughtful, targeted 
approach to what 
they’re doing.”299
Signed a biparti-
san letter to USTR 
Michael Froman call-
ing for negotiations 
to expand market 
access for American 
apple and pear ex-
ports to Europe due 
to different varying 
standards.300
In 2015, voted no 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.301
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.302
R-ID Michael Crapo Chair of the Senate 
Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs
Position generally 
unknown.
Likely skeptical, 
given that he was 
included in a meeting 
President Trump held 
with Senate Repub-
licans concerned 
about investment re-
strictions on Chinese 
investments in the 
United States.303
Wrote a bipartisan 
letter to USTR Mi-
chael Froman calling 
for negotiations to 
expand market ac-
cess for American 
apple and pear ex-
ports to Europe due 
to different varying 
standards.304
In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.305
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.306
D-OH Sherrod Brown Ranking Member of 
Senate Committee 
on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs
Explicitly in favor 
of Trump’s trade 
policies; supported 
the renegotiation of 
NAFTA and blocked 
bipartisan legisla-
tion to limit Trump’s 
power to impose 
tariffs.307
In favor; supports an 
aggressive approach 
toward China related 
to government sub-
sidies, inadequate 
access for US com-
panies, dumping, 
technology transfer, 
and theft of US intel-
lectual property.
Against the inclusion 
of an ISDS mecha-
nism in TTIP, one of 
the most conten-
tious points of the 
legislation.308
In 2015, voted no 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.309
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.310
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Selection of Members of Relevant Caucuses  
D-NY Gregory Meeks Representative
Co-Chair of the Con-
gressional Caucus of 
the European Union
Ranking Member of 
the Europe, Eurasia, 
and Emerging 
Threats  Subcom-
mittee of the House 
Foreign Affairs 
Committee
Skeptical of Trump’s 
trade policies; 
wishes for “free and 
fair trade creating 
jobs throughout 
the cross-Atlantic 
dialogue.”311 
Was co-sponsor of 
the bipartisan reform 
Bill H.R. 5760, the 
Trade Authority Pro-
tection Act, aiming to 
review tariffs arising 
from Section 301 of 
the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962, of Sec-
tion 232 of the Trade 
Act of 1974, and of 
Section 301 of the 
Trade Act of 1974. 
Under this proposal, 
tariffs would take ef-
fect only if Congress 
does not disapprove, 
thereby introducing 
the opportunity to 
veto presidential de-
cisions on tariffs.312
Critical; issued a 
statement as the 
New Democrat 
Coalition Trade Task 
Force Co-Chair: “[…] 
we should not put 
our own industries 
and American jobs at 
risk for a half-baked, 
poorly thought 
through retalia-
tory action against 
the second largest 
economy in the world 
[…] Instead of impos-
ing higher tariffs on 
a broad range of 
consumer goods, the 
Trump administra-
tion should focus on 
efforts to enhance 
productivity in all 
sectors.”313
Favorable of TTIP; 
“TTIP was tremen-
dously important.”314 
Tariffs on European 
goods “only help 
China.”315
In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.316
R-SC Joe Wilson Representative
Co-Chair of the Con-
gressional Caucus of 
the European Union 
Ranking Member 
of the Middle East, 
North Africa, and In-
ternational Terrorism 
Subcommittee of the 
House Foreign Affairs 
Committee
Approving of tariffs 
on aluminum and 
steel. Says tariffs are 
a “negotiating tactic 
[…] In the district I 
represent, the steel 
industry […] ulti-
mately it [the tariffs] 
will be beneficial for 
fair trade. […]  To 
me, tariffs are taxes. 
But I see what the 
President is trying 
to do is to promote 
jobs in America and 
to reduce the level of 
imbalance we have 
in trade around the 
world.”317
Approving of 
tariffs on aluminum 
and steel against 
China.318
Position unknown. In 2015, voted yes 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.319
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D-MA Elizabeth Warren Vice Chair of the 
Senate Democratic 
Caucus 
Contender for Demo-
cratic US President 
Candidacy
Critical; considers 
it to be “negoti-
ated by a handful 
of executives from 
giant corporations”; 
advocates a new 
course of trade 
policy in the United 
States;320 criticized 
exclusions on steel 
and aluminum tariffs 
based on inadequate 
access for US 
companies.321
Wary of the tariffs; 
considers them to 
be only one “tool in a 
toolbox.”322
Not clear; was very 
critical regarding 
TPP.
In 2015, voted no 
on Bill H.R. 2146, 
which re-authorized 
the Trade Promotion 
Authority.323
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.324
Others
D-CA Kamala Harris Senator Contender 
for Democratic US 
President Candidacy
Critical; says, “ac-
tions by President 
Trump will only bring 
us close to a trade 
war that will hurt 
California jobs and 
our workforce”;325 
supported a bipar-
tisan Senate resolu-
tion against steel and 
aluminum tariffs.326
Against, citing the 
detrimental impact 
on California’s 
economy.327
No opinion known; 
entered the Senate 
after TTIP was put 
on ice.
Was not in office in 
2015 when Bill H.R. 
2146, which re-
authorized the Trade 
Promotion Authority, 
was voted on. 
In July 2018, voted 
yes on a non-binding 
resolution to allow 
Congress authority in 
Section 232 actions 
on national security 
grounds.328
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